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INTRODUCTION

Ralph Kampen was just trying to be a good father. His daughter
complained of a strange noise coming from underneath her 1989 Isuzu
Impulse, so Kampen jacked up the car with the manufacturer-provided tire
jack and slid his body under the car to inspect the undercarriage.1 The jack
failed, and the falling car crushed Kampen, breaking both of his
collarbones.2 Kampen brought suit against Isuzu under the Louisiana
Products Liability Act (LPLA), alleging that the jack was defective in
construction.3
To recover under the LPLA, Kampen first had to prove the threshold
element that his damages “arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the
product.”4 The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Isuzu, but a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that a jury
could find Kampen’s use of the jack was “reasonably anticipated” because
the jack was being used to elevate the car—the exact use Isuzu surely
intended when it made the jack.5 The Fifth Circuit en banc reheard the case
and redefined Kampen’s “use” to include the placing of his body under the
car.6 The court then held that although a reasonably anticipated use of the
jack was to change a tire, it was not a reasonably anticipated use to jack
up the car to inspect the undercarriage.7 The court dismissed Kampen’s
claim.8

1.
1998).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 308 (5th Cir.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 308.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54 (2018).
Kampen, 157 F.3d at 308–10.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 318.
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Kampen demonstrates the power of the judiciary to dismiss a case by
defining reasonably anticipated use as a matter of law.9 In Kampen’s case,
a jury never had a chance to hear the evidence, decide whether the jack
was, in fact, unreasonably dangerous under the LPLA, or determine
whether Isuzu was liable.10 The Fifth Circuit’s shift of decision-making
power from the jury to the judge is inconsistent with Louisiana tort law,
and its consequences can be far-reaching.11 Not only do trial courts
frequently grant summary judgment based on a determination that the
plaintiff’s use of a product was not reasonably anticipated, but even when
a case goes before a jury, appellate courts can redefine “reasonably
anticipated use” on appeal and effectively overturn jury verdicts.12
Kampen shows that fact-specific definitions of “reasonably
anticipated use” are more likely to incorporate aspects of a plaintiff’s
negligence, which further skews the LPLA analysis.13 There is no doubt
that Kampen’s negligent conduct contributed to the existence and severity
of his injuries, but Louisiana law dictates that analysis of a defendant’s
fault and a plaintiff’s contributory negligence should be separate.14 Yet the
court dismissed Kampen’s claim based on a “reasonably anticipated use”
definition built around his negligence.15 In choosing a fact-specific product
use definition, the Kampen court not only usurped the jury’s decisionmaking power, but also arguably barred the plaintiff’s recovery on account
of his negligence in a manner inconsistent with Louisiana’s comparative
fault regime.16
Over the last 30 years, both state and federal courts have struggled to
apply the LPLA’s reasonably anticipated use requirement in a
straightforward manner that best comports with Louisiana law.17 Courts
9. See Butz v. Lynch, 762 So. 2d 1214, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
10. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(B) (2018).
11. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 184–
85 (La. 2013). See generally Maraist et al., Answering a Fool According to His
Folly: Ruminations on Comparative Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105
(2010).
12. See, e.g., Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equip. Mfg. Co., 70 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1995).
13. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 310–11.
14. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (2018); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521
So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988).
15. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 310–11.
16. See generally DAVID W. ROBERTSON, THE LOUISIANA LAW OF
COMPARATIVE FAULT: A DECADE OF PROGRESS 9, 21–28 (1991) (arguing that
judges should not use duty/risk or the “sole proximate cause” doctrine to conclude
that a plaintiff’s injury is outside the scope of the defendant’s duty because the
plaintiff is at fault and thereby override percentage fault determinations by the jury).
17. See infra Part IV.
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have conflated legal analysis of product use with questions of breach,
proximate cause, and comparative fault, resulting in serious consequences
for litigants.18 The Louisiana Supreme Court must unambiguously reject
improper applications of “reasonably anticipated use” in the existing case
law and provide a detailed method for analyzing an LPLA claim by
drawing, in part, on its premises-liability jurisprudence and general
negligence law.19 The Court should further provide guidance on how to
define the scope of “reasonably anticipated use” in a general manner that
prevents analytical confusion. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court
should clarify that “reasonably anticipated use,” despite defining the
manufacturer’s duty, is usually a mixed question of fact and law for the
jury to decide, unless the judge determines that reasonable minds could
not differ.20 Finally, the Court should draw on a recent Louisiana appellate
case for an example of how to properly review an LPLA claim.21
Part I of this Comment provides background on products liability law,
both nationally and in Louisiana, and summarizes the basic structure of
the LPLA. Part II examines the meaning of “reasonably anticipated use,”
beginning with a textual analysis, followed by a review of the legal
commentary and a comparison with the pre-LPLA jurisprudence’s
“normal use” standard. Part III considers how courts should apply
“reasonably anticipated use” by referring to both the common law and
Louisiana duty/risk frameworks for analyzing negligence. Part III also
discusses how Louisiana’s recent premises liability jurisprudence can be
applied by analogy to LPLA claims and notes that disagreement over the
proper application of “reasonably anticipated use” is part of a larger debate
in Louisiana tort law regarding duty/risk principles and comparative fault.
Part IV traces state and federal case law that has applied “reasonably
anticipated use” and identifies significant trends. Finally, Part V proposes
jurisprudential rules that the Louisiana Supreme Court should adopt to
help guide lower courts in proper analysis of reasonably anticipated use.

18. See, e.g., Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., 641 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2011).
19. See, e.g., Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175
(La. 2013). See also Part III.
20. Broussard, 113 So. 3d 175. For example, reasonable minds could not
differ that using a soda bottle to hammer nails is not a reasonably anticipated use.
21. See Marable v. Empire Truck Sales of La., LLC, 221 So. 3d 880 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2017).
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I. BACKGROUND
Products liability law originated at the intersection of contracts and
torts.22 Historically, the common law severely limited a plaintiff’s ability
to bring an action when a defective product caused damage.23 Under the
doctrine of caveat emptor, product users bore the cost when defective
products caused their injuries.24 As the law developed, the privity of
contract doctrine limited both warranty and negligence actions to
situations where the parties had a contract, meaning an injured consumer
could rarely recover against the manufacturer directly.25 During the middle
of the 20th century, courts began to liberalize products liability law.26
Judges discarded the privity doctrine and embraced tort-based theories of
strict liability and negligence, which more readily enabled consumers to
sue manufacturers directly for damage caused by defective products.27
Today, jurists classify products liability law as a unique subset of tort.28
The Louisiana Supreme Court first recognized an action for products
liability in the 1971 case of Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance.29 In
Weber, the Court held the manufacturer of an arsenic-based “cattle dip”30
liable for the death of a farmer’s seven cattle and the temporary illness of
his sons.31 The Court found that the farmer’s sons had prepared and
applied the dip in accordance with the instructions, but the evidence
showed that the dip contained an excessive amount of arsenic, rendering

22. 1 LOUIS FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 1.02 at
8 (Matthew Bender 2010).
23. DAVID OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.2, at 13–20 (2005).
24. Id. at 17–18 (2005). “Caveat emptor” is Latin for “let the buyer beware.”
Caveat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 1.02 at 8–15; see also OWEN,
supra note 23, at 19–23.
26. See OWEN, supra note 23, at 23–24.
27. Id.
28. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 1.02 at 8; OWEN, supra note
23, at 23–24.
29. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins., 250 So. 2d 754, 757–58 (La. 1971).
Louisiana was relatively late to develop a robust products liability cause of action;
most states’ laws modernized by the 1960s. See OWEN, supra note 23, at 23;
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 1.02 at 37–49.
30. The “cattle dip” at issue was designed “for destroying ticks and biting lice
on cattle” and other livestock. According to the instructions, the user needed to
mix the dip with water and then either briefly submerge the cattle in the mixture
or spray the mixture directly on the cattle. Weber, 250 So. 2d at 762.
31. Id. at 757–58.
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the product “unreasonably dangerous to normal use.”32 The Court did not
elaborate further on the phrase.
From Weber until 1988, Louisiana products liability law remained
judge-made law.33 According to the pre-LPLA case law, a plaintiff in a
products liability case had to prove the following: (1) a condition of the
product caused the plaintiff’s harm; (2) the condition made the product
unreasonably dangerous to normal use; and (3) the condition existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer’s control.34 The case law defined
normal use as “a term of art that includes all intended uses, as well as all
foreseeable uses and misuses of the product.”35
Nationally, by the 1970s, many manufacturers were unhappy with
perceived unfairness in the judicial approach to products liability and
started to push for statutory reforms more favorable to defendants.36 In
Louisiana, the push for a products liability statute intensified after the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., an asbestos case.37 In Halphen, the Court recognized an
32. Id.
33. See John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49
LA. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (1989).
34. See id.; Weber, 250 So. 2d at 755–56; Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986).
35. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 854 (La. 1987).
36. See OWEN, supra note 23, at 24; see also FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 22, § 1.08[4] at 212–17 (explaining how critics claimed that liberal judges
and juries, biased in favor of plaintiffs, imposed exorbitant judgments on
manufacturers that resulted in a lack of affordable liability insurance and rising
business uncertainty). Today, most state legislatures have taken products liability
law from the common law and codified parts or all of it in special statutes. See
DAVID OWEN & MARY DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PROD. LIAB. § 1.12, Appendix
I (4th ed. May 2018 update).
37. See Thomas Galligan, Jr., The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making
Sense of It All, 49 LA. L. REV. 629, 635 (1989) (“The [Louisiana Association of
Business and Industry] rejected an approach that relied upon case-by-case
development of the law after Halphen.”). In contrast to the post-Halphen reform
climate, in 1983, the Louisiana State Law Institute drafted a products liability bill
that did not pass. See H.B. 711, 1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1983). Although
different in many respects, the 1983 bill included the term “reasonably anticipated
use,” later reproduced in the LPLA. Id. §§ 9:2800.2, 2800.3. The 1983 bill, in
turn, was partly inspired by the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (UPLA),
developed by a United States Department of Commerce task force on products
liability. See Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (Oct. 31,
1979); William Crawford, The Louisiana Products Liability Act, 36 LA. B.J. 172,
173 (1988). The UPLA defined product use in terms of “reasonably anticipated
conduct,” not “use.” UPLA § 102(G), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62717.
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“unreasonably dangerous per se” theory of recovery under which a
manufacturer could be liable for the damage its product caused if the
product’s “danger-in-fact” outweighed its utility, even if the manufacturer
did not know nor could have known of the risk of harm.38 Notably, this
theory of recovery precluded the manufacturer from relying on the “stateof-the-art” defense, which otherwise allowed a manufacturer to defend
against liability by showing that it neither knew nor could have known the
product was unreasonably dangerous based on the technical knowledge
available at the time.39
In 1988, with Louisiana in the nadir of a decade-long economic slump
and a new governor promising a wave of reform, the legislature codified
the entirety of products liability law in the Louisiana Revised Statutes
when it passed the LPLA.40 Similar in spirit to prior case law, the LPLA
requires a plaintiff to prove four things: (1) the defendant manufactured
the product; (2) the damages were “proximately caused by a characteristic
of the product”; (3) the characteristic made the product “unreasonably
dangerous,” as defined by the LPLA; and (4) the damages “arose from a
reasonably anticipated use of the product.”41 The LPLA states that it
contains the “exclusive theories of liability” by which a plaintiff can
recover against a manufacturer when a defective product causes damage;
it therefore provides statutory definitions of what would constitute “fault”
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 in a products liability action.42
38. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
Manufacturers perceived the decision as favorable to plaintiffs and hostile to
defendants. See generally William Crawford, Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.—Products Liability Rewritten, 47 LA. L. REV. 485 (1986).
39. Crawford, supra note 38, at 488; see also Michelle M. Hoss, Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.—A New Product in the Area of Products Liability, 47
LA. L. REV. 637, 640–44 (1986).
40. See Galligan, supra note 37, at 632. See generally Ronald Smothers,
Governor’s Swearing in Is Modest Affair for Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/15/us/governor-s-swearing-in-is-mod
est-affair-for-louisiana.html [https://perma.cc/5SYV-C4UZ]; Lisa Belkin, The
Nation: ‘Revolution’ in Louisiana; Picaresque to Pragmatic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/14/weekinreview/the-nation-revolutionin-louisiana-picaresque-to-pragmatic.html [https://perma.cc/W6GY-VPUF]. The
codification of products liability law is part of a broader codification trend in
Louisiana tort law. See generally Maraist et al., supra note 11, at 1134–44.
41. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A) (2018); see Kennedy, supra note 33, at
583.
42. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.52; Galligan, supra note 37, at 632. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2315 (2018) (“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”).
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The LPLA broke with prior law, in part, by dispensing with the term
“defective” and instead defining four ways that a product can be
“unreasonably dangerous.”43 The LPLA also substituted the term
“reasonably anticipated use” for “normal use.”44 Specific LPLA
provisions generated disagreement,45 but contemporary commentators
agreed on the law’s main substantive changes, including: (1) elimination
of the “unreasonably dangerous per se” theory recognized in Halphen;
(2) prohibition on recovery of attorneys’ fees in LPLA cases; and (3)
detailed statutory treatment of the “dangerous design” liability theory and
“state of the art” defense.46
Contemporary commentators generally agreed that the LPLA’s
definition of “reasonably anticipated use” was not intended to
substantively change the law.47 At the time the legislature passed the
LPLA, the majority view among commentators was that “reasonably
anticipated use” served the same purpose as “normal use,” but would

43. See also Kennedy, supra note 33, at 571. The four theories of liability
are: (1) unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition; (2) unreasonably
dangerous in design; (3) unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning
about the product was not provided; or (4) unreasonably dangerous because the
product does not conform to an express warranty. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(B).
See infra Section III.B.
44. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7).
45. Particularly contentious were the details of the burden of proof regarding
the “state of the art” defense. Galligan, supra note 37, at 637–38. Indeed, there was
also disagreement over whether the legislature should have passed a products
liability statute at all. The goal of the LPLA’s proponents—led by the Louisiana
Association of Business and Industry (LABI)—was to overrule Halphen and protect
industry from the perceived threat of liberal courts, large judgments, and
unaffordable liability insurance. Governor “Buddy” Roemer’s stated goals were to
clarify products liability law and align Louisiana’s law with the perceived national
“mainstream.” Opponents—led by the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association
(LTLA, now known as the Louisiana Association for Justice, or “LAJ”)—favored
a broad and short statute, or none at all, over the bill that was introduced. Id. at 634.
LABI and the LTLA agreed to a compromise amendment on the Senate floor
regarding the state-of-the-art defense. As a result, neither side opposed the bill in
the House of Representatives, clearing the way for its final passage. Id. at 637–38.
46. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 582, 587, 602, 606–08; Galligan, supra note
37, at 638, 644, 675; William Crawford, Developments in the Law, 1987–1988—
Torts, 49 LA. L. REV. 543, 544 (1988).
47. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 585–86; Galligan, supra note 37, at 639
(“The new phrase does not appear to change the law in this area.”).
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perhaps express the concept more clearly.48 Only a minority of
commentators took the opposing view that “reasonably anticipated use”
intentionally restricted manufacturer liability.49 By 1996, however, one
commentator declared that “the area most significantly altered” by the
LPLA was “the construction of ‘product use.’”50
II. THE MEANING OF “REASONABLY ANTICIPATED USE”
The LPLA defines “reasonably anticipated use” as “a use or handling
of a product that the product’s manufacturer should reasonably expect of
an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.”51 The civilian
tradition dictates that legislation and custom are the primary sources of
law.52 Therefore, an examination of “reasonably anticipated use” should
begin with a close reading of the definition.53 The statutory language
48. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 585–86 (1989) (“[T]he drafters of the
LPLA believed that ‘reasonably anticipated use’ would serve the same purpose as
‘normal use,’ but do so more efficiently.”).
49. See Crawford, supra note 46, at 543 (“[T]he new term [reasonably
anticipated use] is specifically defined in the Act and suggests a more restrictive
scope of liability than would have attached under the ‘normal use’ or ‘foreseeable
use’ provisions.”).
50. Andrew Hammond, Hunter ex. rel. Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equipment
Manufacturing Company: The Fifth Circuit Narrows the Scope of “Reasonably
Anticipated Use” Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 70 TUL. L. REV.
1659, 1664 (1996). According to this argument, any judicial derivation from
general tort principles like comparative fault in LPLA application is a reflection
of legislative will. See Crawford, supra note 46, at 544; LeBreton v. Rabito, 714
So. 2d 1226, 1229 (La. 1998) (“Rules of statutory construction provide that where
two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if
possible; however, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the
matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in
character.”). But see John Kennedy, Highlights for Lawyers of the 1988 Regular
Legislative Session, 36 LA. B.J. 164, 165 (1988) (“The LPLA is not as broad as it
may seem at first glance. The statute deals primarily with theories of liability. Nor
does it affect current Louisiana legal doctrines that pertain generally to tort
litigation,” including comparative fault.).
51. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7) (2018).
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2018).
53. The Louisiana Civil Code instructs the judge that “[w]hen a law is clear
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the
law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search
of the intent of the legislature.” Id. art. 9. Words “must be given their prevailing
meaning,” but “words of art and technical terms must be given their technical
meaning when the law involves a technical matter.” Id. art. 11.
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contains at least three phrases in need of further defining: (1) “reasonably
expect”; (2) “ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances”; and
(3) “use or handling.”
A. Definition of “Reasonably Anticipated Use” Is Fact-Specific
The dictionary definition of “expect”—“to anticipate or look forward
to”54—adds little to the understanding of the synonymous term
“anticipated,” defined as “expected or looked forward to.”55 Both “expect”
and “anticipate” do, however, address concerns that “normal use” was
improperly analyzed with post-accident hindsight because both words
evoke consideration of future potential uses from a set point in time in the
past.56 The modifier “reasonably”—defined in Merriam-Webster’s
dictionary as “being in accord with reason”57 and in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances”58—is
also of little help because these definitions are subjective to each
individual or community. Notions of what is “fair” or “proper” are likely
influenced by each person’s life experience, cultural background, personal
beliefs, and customs.59 Perhaps it is fair to conclude that “reasonably
expect” and “reasonably anticipated” are equally opaque, with the
definitions lying in the eye of the beholder.60

54. Expect, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/expect [https://perma.cc/QY64-5B5S] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
55. Anticipated, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/anticipated [https://perma.cc/HL2Q-87PQ] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2018).
56. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586. The “normal use” critics claimed that
judges and juries were unfairly expanding the scope of manufacturer liability by
using hindsight—applying the concept of “normal use” not from the
manufacturer’s point of view at the time the product was made, but from the point
of view of the time of trial. Id.; infra Section II.B.
57. Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/reasonably [https://perma.cc/L2P9-P6V5] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2018).
58. Reasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
59. Because different people will often come to different conclusions when
presented with the same evidence, the question of what is “reasonably anticipated
use” may be best answered by the jury. See infra Section III.B.
60. Incidentally, a search of Black’s Law Dictionary for any reference to
variations of the phrase “reasonably anticipated” leads one to “foreseeability,”
defined as “the quality of being reasonably anticipatable.” Foreseeability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The definition further notes that
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The concept of “an ordinary person in the same or similar
circumstances” provides more guidance because it suggests a flexible
standard tied to the nature of the product.61 For example, one should
analyze the uses expected of an ordinary worker in an industrial setting for
a piece of expensive industrial machinery differently than uses expected
of an ordinary consumer for a widely available and inexpensive product
like an electric clothing iron. The dictionary defines the adjective
“ordinary” as “of a kind to be expected in the normal order of events;
routine; normal.”62 As specifically applied to people, “ordinary” is “typical
of the population or a particular group; average; without exceptional
experience, knowledge, etc.”63 The phrase “ordinary person in same or
similar circumstances” may thus be evocative of the hypothetical
“reasonable person under the circumstances” standard commonly used in
many areas of the law, but with the important caveat that an “ordinary
person,” for purposes of the LPLA, is not a “reasonable person” because
ordinary people are sometimes negligent.64
Finally, “use or handling” is, somewhat oddly, the most difficult part
of the term’s definition. The dictionary definition provides little help.65 On
“foreseeability, along with actual causation, is an element of proximate cause in
tort law.” Id. See also infra Section III.D.
61. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7) (2018).
62. Ordinary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ordinary [https://perma.cc/5BW3-QS9A] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2018).
63. Ordinary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004).
64. Reasonable Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Unless the
actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being
negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”). Commentators
writing about the LPLA have noted that “reasonably anticipated use” includes
misuse, which surely can encompass negligent use. See Kennedy, supra note 33,
at 584 (“The purpose of both terms is to express the types of product uses and
misuses by a consumer that a manufacturer must take into account when he
designs a product, drafts instructions for its use and provides warnings about the
product’s dangers in order that the product not be unreasonably dangerous.”);
Galligan, supra note 37, at 639 (“‘[R]easonably anticipated use,’ like ‘normal
use,’ should include foreseeable or expected misuse where the court decides that
the misuse is within the scope of the manufacturer’s duty to make a safe
product.”).
65. “Use” means “the act or practice of employing something: employment,
application,” or “a method or manner of employing or applying something.” Use,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/use [https://perma.cc/W7QV-TXZS] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). The noun
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some level, no definition could be helpful because what constitutes “use
or handling” for the purposes of the LPLA is dependent on what is
“reasonably expect[ed] of an ordinary person in the same or similar
circumstances.”66 Another facet of product “use” is the specificity of the
definition and the degree to which it should include environmental factors
or user attributes.67 For example, the use of riding a bicycle could be
defined generally as bike riding. More specifically, one’s use of the bike
could be defined, in part, in relation to the environment or the conditions
under which the rider is using it—for example, bike riding on pavement
could be defined as a different use than bike riding on sand, or bike riding
in the rain as a different use than riding on a sunny day. Theoretically, one
could further define use to include the user’s specific attributes or
conduct—for example, riding with or without a helmet—or the user’s
purpose, such as riding to the library versus riding to the liquor store. The
text of the LPLA gives no clear answer on how generally or specifically
to define the scope of use.68 Having found no answer through examination
of the text, one may look next to outside sources—scholarly commentary
and case law—for additional guidance.69
“handling” means “the action of one that handles something” or “the manner in
which something is treated.” Synonyms of “handling” include “administration,”
“conduct,” “control,” “management,” and “stewardship.” Handling, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/handling
[https://perma.cc/7SBN-55GD] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). The Model UPLA
employed “reasonably anticipated conduct” in place of “reasonably anticipated
use.” Model Uniform Products Liability Act § 102(G), 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62717
(Oct. 31, 1979). If the LPLA drafters had intended “handling” to mean “conduct,”
presumably they would have followed the UPLA and used the word “conduct.”
The more likely interpretation is that “handling” is meant in the more mechanical
sense of the verb “handle”: “to act on or perform a required function with regard
to.” Handle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/handles [https://perma.cc/99VN-QKEN] (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
66. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7) (2018).
67. See, e.g., Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 310 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“Under the liability scheme set up by the LPLA, then, Kampen’s
injuries must have arisen from a reasonably anticipated use of the jack. But that
begs the following questions: which of Kampen’s actions on the day of his injury
should we consider as ‘use’ of the jack? . . . At the outset, we note that the level
of generality at which a plaintiff’s ‘use’ of a product is defined will bear directly
on whether the plaintiff satisfies the LPLA’s reasonably anticipated use
requirement.”).
68. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:2800.53(7), 2800.54(A).
69. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1, cmt. b (2018) (“According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are
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B. No Difference Between “Normal” and “Reasonably Anticipated” Use
According to commentators, the phrases “reasonably anticipated use”
and “normal use” serve the same purpose: to define the product uses that
fall within the scope of the manufacturer’s duty to make a reasonably safe
product.70 But if the terms are meant to serve the same purpose and the
legislative intent was not to change the law, then why did the LPLA not
retain “normal use,” if only to reduce confusion?71 Critics of the pre-LPLA
jurisprudence claimed that courts struggled with application of the
“normal use” standard.72 According to this argument, courts improperly
employed post-accident hindsight at the time of trial to decide whether the
plaintiff’s use was “normal,” instead of considering whether the use was
reasonably foreseeable from the manufacturer’s point of view at the time
it made the product.73 By applying foreseeability with the benefit of
hindsight, courts supposedly expanded the concept of “normal use” to hold
manufacturers liable for damages that arose from “every conceivable
foreseeable use.”74 The LPLA drafters chose “reasonably anticipated use”

contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence,
doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the court in reaching a
decision in the absence of legislation and custom.”).
70. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 584; Galligan, supra note 37, at 639.
71. Usually, a legislative deviation from the prior jurisprudence is deemed to
be intentional, and it is the proper role of the judiciary to give effect to that
legislative intent.
72. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586. One criticism was the lack of a
consistent definition of “normal use,” with courts describing the term as
“foreseeable use or misuse,” “not limited to intended use,” “reasonably
foreseeable use,” “probable use,” use that “the manufacturer may reasonably
expect,” “normal application,” and “foreseeably dangerous use,” among other
descriptors. Id. (citations omitted).
73. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586. This criticism is part of a larger
debate in tort law over how to analyze proximate cause. See, e.g., Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound)
[1961], A.C 388; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965).
74. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586. (“It is foreseeable that a consumer might
use a soft drink bottle for a hammer, might attempt to drive his automobile across
water or might pour perfume on a candle to scent it. If he does, however, the
manufacturer of the product should not be and under the LPLA is not liable
because the uses in the illustrations are not the sort that a manufacturer should
reasonably expect of an ordinary consumer.”).
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rather than “normal use” to prohibit the fact-finder from expanding the
scope of liability beyond what the drafters intended.75
If courts were supposed to apply “normal use” with foresight, not
hindsight, then the change in terminology, somewhat paradoxically, did
not change the substantive law.76 Rather, the term “reasonably anticipated
use” was the legislature’s attempt to describe the proper method of
analyzing product use, instead of redefining product use.77 According to
Governor Roemer’s executive counsel, John Kennedy,78 reasonably
anticipated use is “narrower” than normal use specifically because “unlike
‘normal use,’ the LPLA term does not address the issue of postmanufacturer changes to the product or improper maintenance.”79 Courts
routinely cite Kennedy’s phraseology out of context, however, stating that
“reasonably anticipated use” is “narrower” than “normal use” in an
axiomatic manner, suggesting that the LPLA term was meant to restrict
manufacturer liability across the board.80
Interestingly, a review of pre-LPLA cases shows that courts did not
struggle to apply the concept of “normal use” in the same way they have
grappled with the LPLA’s “reasonably anticipated use” requirement.81
75. Id.
76. By contrast, the LPLA’s elimination of the “unreasonably dangerous per
se” theory of liability was a clear change in the law that restricted manufacturer
liability. See id. at 587; Galligan, supra note 37, at 640.
77. Incidentally, in the same year the LPLA was passed, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held in a medical malpractice case that when determining
proximate cause, the fact-finder should apply foreseeability with foresight, not
hindsight, so as to not unfairly hold the defendant liable for risks that he could not
have foreseen. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 520 So. 2d. 1151, 1161 (La. 1988).
78. Currently, John Kennedy is the junior U.S. Senator from Louisiana.
79. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586. Rather, the issue of post-manufacturer
changes is addressed in a separate part of the LPLA using the “reasonably
anticipated alteration or modification” concept. See LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:2800.53(8), 2800.54(C) (2018).
80. See, e.g., Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229, 231 (La. 2011) (“Notably, this
definition [of reasonably anticipated use] is narrower in scope than its pre-LPLA
counterpart, ‘normal use’. . . .”).
81. See Whiteacre v. Halo Optical, 501 So. 2d 994 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that playing racquetball fell within “normal use” of protective sportswear
glasses and that the manufacturer was liable for failing to warn that a ball moving
at high speed could fit through the rim and strike an eye); LeBouef v. Goodyear,
623 F.2d 985, 989, 989 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that driving a sports car at
nearly 100 miles per hour fell within “normal use”: “It was not simply foreseeable,
but was to be readily expected, that [the car] would, on occasion, be driven in
excess of the 85 mile per hour proven maximum safe operating speed of its
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Rather, debate in the pre-LPLA jurisprudence largely focused on issues
concerning the definition of “defective,”82 product modification and poor
maintenance,83 or the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s causation evidence.84
Theoretically, then, little meaningful difference exists between
“normal use” and “reasonably anticipated use.” In practice, however,
courts have applied the concepts differently, not by substitution of
foresight for hindsight, but rather by defining “use” more specifically
under the LPLA.85 The LPLA cases show that the more precisely a court
defines “reasonably anticipated use,” the more likely that court will
formulate a definition that excludes a particular plaintiff’s negligent use,
resulting in a finding of no liability because the plaintiff’s use is
purportedly outside the scope of the manufacturer’s duty.86 Further,
Goodyear tires”); Cobb v. Insured Lloyds, 387 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1980) (holding that the manufacturer should have anticipated that a gun owner
would carry a weapon fully loaded with the hammer in the full-forward position
because this is the typical “safety” position on many handguns); cf. infra Part IV.
82. See Norris v. Bell Helicopter, 495 So. 2d 976 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986);
Stevens v. Rex Chainbelt, 349 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Scott v.
White Trucks, 669 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1983).
83. See, e.g., Winterrowd v. Travelers Indem. Co., 452 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1984).
84. See Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850–51 (La. 1987) (holding the
manufacturer not liable for a barn fire because, although failure to warn that the
catalytic converter system could ignite a fire if the car was parked in high grass
rendered the car “unreasonably dangerous to normal use,” the plaintiff failed to
show an essential element of causation, that is, that an adequate warning would
have in fact prevented him from parking his car in the barn and starting the fire);
Quattlebaum v. Hy-Reach Equipment Inc., 453 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1984) (holding the manufacturer of a hydraulic crane basket truck operated
without outriggers not liable for failure to warn because it had provided warnings
and alterative safety equipment to the owner that leased the machine to the user
who was injured).
85. See Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1994) (defining use of standing on a folding chair as standing on the back of a
folding chair); Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir.
1998) (defining use of a tire jack as using a jack to elevate a car for the purpose
of inspecting the undercarriage instead of changing a tire); Hunter v. Knoll Rig &
Equip. Mfg. Co., 70 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining use of a rack for stacking
pipes as stacking pipe with a “negative lean” instead of with a “positive lean”).
86. The dynamic of defining duty to exclude a plaintiff’s negligence is one
facet of a larger debate among Louisiana’s legal commentators about judicial
techniques that define duty in relation to plaintiff negligence, and whether those
techniques are consistent with Louisiana’s system of pure comparative fault. See
David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk, Affirmative
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reliance on specific “reasonably anticipated use” definitions to decide
cases as a matter of law has shifted power from jury to judge.87 Lack of
analytical clarity in the case law has obscured this shift in power, but
consistent application of traditional tort concepts to LPLA cases would
help to uncover it.
III. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO APPLYING “REASONABLY
ANTICIPATED USE” IN THE LPLA CONTEXT
The judiciary has interpreted and applied the LPLA as a special
statutory cause of action with its own unique elements of reasonably
anticipated use, unreasonably dangerous characteristic of the product, and
proximate cause.88 The LPLA is clearly a tort-based statute to which basic
tort law applies, but reference to traditional elements of duty or breach does
not appear in the LPLA cases in an organized fashion.89 Instead, the legal
analysis is inconsistent, with courts often over-relying on “reasonably
anticipated use” to simultaneously analyze multiple tort concepts of duty,
breach, and causation.90 Understanding the LPLA in terms of the wellknown elements of common law negligence and Louisiana duty/risk will
help to clarify the analysis.
Under the common law approach, the plaintiff must prove five
elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) cause-in-fact, (4) proximate cause, and
(5) damages.91 In Louisiana, however, the duty/risk analysis is the
preferred method for analyzing negligence.92 To recover under the
duty/risk approach, the plaintiff must prove: (1) cause-in-fact; (2) scope of
the duty, (that is, whether the specific risk the plaintiff would incur the
Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation
in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1341 (1984); Alston Johnson, Comparative
Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV. 319 (1980); Maraist et al.,
supra note 11.
87. See generally Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d
175 (La. 2013).
88. See, e.g., Marable v. Empire Truck Sales of La., LLC, 221 So. 3d 880
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
89. See infra Part IV.
90. Ironically, this misapplication of “reasonably anticipated use” is
reminiscent of pre-LPLA criticisms of supposed misapplication of “normal use.”
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 33, at 586.
91. See, e.g., Naifeh v. Valley Forge Life Ins., 204 S.W.3d 758, 771 (Tenn.
2006); see also Thomas Galligan, A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA.
L. REV. 1509, 1510 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Harris v. Pizza Hut of La., Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1369–70 (La.
1984).
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type of damage he suffered falls within the scope of the defendant’s duty);
(3) breach; and (4) damages.93 Finally, under either approach, only after
the jury establishes the defendant’s fault should it apply comparative fault
principles, determine the percentage of fault of each person who
contributed to the damages, and reduce the amount of the plaintiff’s
recovery in proportion to the plaintiff’s percentage of fault, if any.94 The
key difference between the approaches is that the duty and proximate
cause elements are kept separate at common law but are combined into a
single element under duty/risk.95
A. Duty
“Reasonably anticipated use” is best understood as part of the
definition of the manufacturer’s duty to design, produce, and provide
warnings and instructions for a product such that it is not “unreasonably
dangerous.”96 A manufacturer does not have a duty to protect all persons
from all harm related to all uses of its product; rather, a manufacturer’s
duty is limited to making a product that is not unreasonably dangerous for
reasonably anticipated uses.97 Courts often treat duty as the threshold
element in analyzing any LPLA claim.98
Traditionally, whether a general duty exists is a legal question for the
judge to decide.99 In the LPLA context, the key issues are: (1) the level of
specificity at which to define use—that is, duty—and (2) whether the
judge or the jury should have to power to decide the specifics.100 Consider
Kampen again.101 The court could have defined duty broadly, as “don’t
make a jack that is unreasonably dangerous for reasonably anticipated
93. Id.; see also Galligan, supra note 91, at 1526. Alternatively, duty/risk
could be divided into five elements if the question of whether the defendant owed
a duty in general is considered separately from the duty/risk or “scope of the duty”
element, focusing on the whether the specific risk fell within that duty. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974). Arguably, this latter approach makes
more sense for a products liability claim because it better tracks with the LPLA’s
elements.
94. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018).
95. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1529.
96. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 584; see also Galligan, supra note 37, at 639.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 314 (5th
Cir. 1998).
99. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1510–11.
100. See supra Section II.B. See generally Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of
State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175 (La. 2013).
101. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 306; see also Introduction.
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uses,” and allowed the jury decide whether Kampen’s use fell within that
definition. Instead, the court defined duty more narrowly, as “don’t make
a jack that is unreasonably dangerous for jacking up your car to change a
tire” and thereby dismissed Kampen’s claim on the grounds that Isuzu had
no duty as a matter of law.102 The importance of the duty determination
cannot be overstated—a judge’s finding of no duty prevents the plaintiff’s
case from progressing to the jury for a determination of whether there was
a breach, as seen in Kampen.103
B. Breach
Breach occurs when a product is “unreasonably dangerous” as defined
by the LPLA.104 A product can be “unreasonably dangerous,” meaning a
manufacturer can breach its duty, in four ways: (1) construction or
composition;105 (2) design;106 (3) inadequate warning;107 or (4) nonconformity to an express warranty.108 To constitute a breach, the
“unreasonably dangerous” characteristic of the product usually must have
existed at the time the product left the manufacturer’s control.109 In the
case of a dangerous design or failure to warn claim, however, the
characteristic can also result from a “reasonably anticipated alteration or
modification of the product.”110
Breach is a question for the fact-finder, unless reasonable minds could
not differ, in which case a directed verdict would be appropriate.111 A clear
analytical overlap exists between the duty and breach elements.112
Defining one element necessarily defines the other, such that each element
can be thought of as the inverse of the other. Reflecting back on Kampen,
102. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 309–10; see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2018).
103. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 318.
104. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54 (2018). Four of the LPLA’s ten sections are
dedicated to describing the breach element. See id. §§ 9:2800.55–58.
105. Id. § 9:2800.55.
106. Id. § 9:2800.56.
107. Id. § 9:2800.57.
108. Id. § 9:2800.58.
109. Id. § 9:2800.54(C).
110. Id. The construction of the LPLA suggests that issues of product
alteration and modification are to be treated as part of the breach question, not as
part of the manufacturer’s duty, because the concept is located alongside the
“unreasonably dangerous” section of the LPLA and not with “reasonably
anticipated use.” Id.
111. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1512. The jury is usually considered as the
fact-finder, but the judge can also sit as trier of fact during a bench trial.
112. See generally Maraist et al., supra note 11.
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the mere fact that the jack failed would not automatically result in a
breach.113 Rather, whether there is an “unreasonably dangerous” breach
under the LPLA depends on how the court defines the manufacturer’s
duty.114
The key difference between duty and breach is the procedural power
of whether the judge or the jury has the power to decide.115 The textbook
rules dictate that duty is a question of law for the judge, and breach is a
question of fact for the jury.116 The reality is more complicated, however,
and requires recognizing a distinction between purely legal duty questions
for the judge to decide and duty questions that are a mix of law and fact
and therefore more appropriate for the jury.117
The LPLA answers most legal duty questions by broadly defining who
can bring an LPLA claim and what damages are recoverable.118 In most
LPLA cases, however, the question of whether a use was reasonably
anticipated does not involve similarly far-reaching policy questions.119
Instead, the analysis is focused on defining the manufacturer’s duty in that
specific case based on a multitude of factual determinations, including:
(1) what the manufacturer knew or should have known about product use
113. See supra Introduction; Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157
F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1998).
114. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54 (2018); supra Section III.A.
115. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1510–12.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175
(La. 2013). Legal duty questions are often general, asking whether the defendant
and the plaintiff had the type of relationship that should impose a duty on the
defendant, or whether any defendant should be liable for a certain type of
damages. See Galligan, supra note 91, at 1510−11. In products liability, a
historical example is whether a defendant’s duty was limited to those with whom
it had privity of contract, but a more contemporary example is the question of
whether the plaintiff can recover for emotional damages or attorneys’ fees. See
supra Part I. The answer to these legal questions are “rules” that are applicable to
entire categories of cases. Given the need for consistency, judges are arguably in
a better position than juries to consider the policy implications of “rule” questions.
See generally Frank Maraist, Of Envelopes and Legends: Reflections on Tort Law,
61 LA. L. REV. 153, 163 (2000). By contrast, mixed questions are usually more
appropriate for the jury because they are dependent on factual determinations. See,
e.g., Broussard, 113 So. 3d 175.
118. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53 (defining “claimant” and “damage”).
“The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage . . .
[arising from] a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or
another person or entity.” Id. § 9:2800.54(A).
119. But see infra Section IV.C.
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at the time of manufacture; (2) whether the product’s warning or
instructions were adequate; (3) whether the use would be considered
obviously dangerous by potential users; (4) whether actual uses and
misuses existed and were prevalent; and (5) other thorny issues not
solvable by mechanical application of a legal rule.120 Because the
definition in a given case is likely to be heavily dependent on the facts
surrounding a particular product at a particular time, courts should
consider reasonably anticipated use as a mixed question.121
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent premises liability
jurisprudence offers guidance for properly navigating the duty/breach
overlap and can be applied by analogy to the LPLA.122 In Broussard v.
State, a deliveryman ruptured a disk in his back while pulling a dolly
loaded with boxes onto an elevator that stopped several inches above the
floor.123 The State, which owned the building, knew the elevator routinely
stopped inches or feet above or below the floor.124 A jury found the State
liable for the plaintiff’s injury and also apportioned a percentage of fault
to the plaintiff for not exercising due care.125 The appellate court reversed
the jury verdict as manifestly erroneous, finding the defective condition of
the elevator was “open and obvious” and therefore not unreasonably
dangerous, reasoning that the State had no duty to protect the
deliveryman.126
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury
verdict.127 The Court characterized the question of whether a defect was
unreasonably dangerous as a mixed issue of fact and law that is “peculiarly
a question for the jury or trier of the facts.”128 Further, the Court stated that
although there is in theory no duty to guard against a defective condition
that is “open and obvious,” whether the condition is “open and obvious”
120. See infra Part IV.
121. See infra Part IV.
122. Broussard, 113 So. 3d 175. See generally John M. Church, Recent
Developments: Broussard v. State and the Not So Obvious Application of the Open
and Obvious Doctrine, 74 LA. L. REV. 857 (2014).
123. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 180.
124. Id. at 179–80.
125. Id. at 178–79.
126. Id. at 181. The appellate court further noted that Broussard admitted he
knew of the defect and suggested he could have avoided the injury by calling a
different elevator or breaking his delivery up into smaller loads. Id. (citing
Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of Bldgs., No. 2011 CA 0479, 2012 WL 1079182
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011)).
127. Id. at 179.
128. Id. at 183.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 314

4/15/20 8:48 AM

2020]

COMMENT

593

is a factual question for the jury to decide as part of its breach inquiry.129
In other words, in these cases, it is proper for the jury, not the judge, to
decide whether the defendant owed no duty as part of the determination of
whether a duty was breached.130 According to the Court, to hold otherwise
would conflate the duty and breach elements in a manner that causes an
inappropriate transfer of jury power to judges.131
Broussard can be applied by analogy to a typical LPLA claim as such:
a manufacturer is only liable for injuries caused by a product characteristic
that is unreasonably dangerous, much like a building owner is only liable
for damage caused by a condition that presents an unreasonable risk of
harm.132 Manufacturers have no duty to protect against unreasonably
dangerous characteristics when the use is not reasonably anticipated, just
as building owners theoretically have no duty to guard against “open and
obvious” defective conditions.133 In both situations, however, the issue of
whether a defect is “open and obvious” or a use is reasonably anticipated
presents a mixed question of law and fact.134 Therefore, because factspecific questions are involved, the jury should decide if the use was
reasonably anticipated as part of its breach determination, just as the jury
should decide whether the defect was open and obvious.135 To otherwise
have the judge decide that the use was not reasonably anticipated risks
usurping the jury’s fact-finding power.136 Nonetheless, a jury
determination that a product was defective is not, on its own, sufficient to
impose liability on the manufacturer—the plaintiff must establish that the
defect caused his injuries.

129. Id. at 184–85.
130. Id. (“Thus, while a defendant only has a duty to protect against unreasonable
risks that are not obvious or apparent, the fact-finder, employing a risk-utility
balancing test, determines which risks are unreasonable and whether those risks pose
an open and obvious hazard. In other words, the fact-finder determines whether
defendant has breached a duty to keep its property in a reasonably safe condition by
failing to discover, obviate, or warn of a defect that presents an unreasonable risk of
harm.”) Id. at 185. See generally Maraist et al., supra note 11.
131. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 184–85.
132. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A) (2018). See generally Church, supra
note 122, at 859–60.
133. See Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 184–85.
134. See id. at 183.
135. See id. at 184–85.
136. See id.
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C. Cause-in-Fact
Factual causation between the defendant’s breach of a duty and the
plaintiff’s damages is essential to establishing liability.137 As the name
suggests, cause-in-fact is a question of fact and is thus reserved for the
jury.138 Generally, cause-in-fact is explained in terms of whether the
plaintiff’s damage would have occurred “but for” the defendant’s
negligence.139 Considering Kampen again: “but for” the jack allegedly
failing, his car would not have fallen and crushed him.140 A finding of causein-fact does not automatically result in liability; rather, proximate cause
permits or limits liability in any given case.141
D. “Proximate Cause”
Proximate cause142 is notoriously difficult to define, a problem that has
generated much argument—and, in Louisiana, inspired the creation of
duty/risk as an alternative.143 The LPLA requires a plaintiff to show that
his or her damages were “proximately caused” by an unreasonably
dangerous characteristic of the product, but it provides no guidance for
what “proximately caused” means.144 Adding to the confusion, some
commentators have suggested the LPLA’s use of “proximate cause”
137. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1512. In the LPLA, the words “arose from,”
preceding “reasonably anticipated use,” also evoke the necessity of factual
causation between the plaintiff’s damages and reasonably anticipated use. LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A) (2018). This is not an additional causation
requirement, but a matter of logic because a connection between breach and
damages would necessarily include a connection back to the breached duty.
138. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1512.
139. Id. (noting that cause-in-fact can also be established under some
circumstances by showing the defendant’s negligence played a “substantial
factor” in causing the damage—something more than just a loose association).
140. Imagine another scenario where Kampen was jacking up his car to change
the tire on the side of the road when the jack failed, but it did not injure him.
Immediately thereafter, he was hit by a negligent driver who was texting instead
of watching the road. In that case, there would be no cause-in-fact between the
failure of the jack and the injury because the negligent driver would have hit
Kampen regardless.
141. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A).
142. “Proximate cause” is also sometimes referred to as “legal cause” in
Louisiana. See Galligan, supra note 91, at 1513; see, e.g., Pitre v. Opelousas Gen.
Hosp., 520 So. 2d. 1151 (La. 1988).
143. See Galligan, supra note 91, at 1521–24.
144. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A).
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terminology was not meant to displace duty/risk analysis in products
liability cases.145
In the common law, proximate cause can be considered as a decision
to impose or limit liability that is essentially made on the basis of the factfinder’s sense of fairness.146 Societal policy choices of who should bear
the cost of certain risks under certain circumstances are at the root of
proximate cause determinations.147 More literally, proximate cause is often
explained in terms of whether a plaintiff’s injuries were a natural,
probable, or foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence, as opposed
to being unforeseeable, bizarre, or caused by an “intervening cause” rising
to the level of a “superseding cause” that should relieve the defendant of
liability.148 At common law, the duty question is separate from the
proximate cause question, which is for the jury to decide as fact-finder.149
Under duty/risk, however, duty and proximate cause merge into the single
“duty/risk” element, theoretically giving the judge more power to decide
when and how to draw the outer bounds of liability.150
145. H.B. 711, 1983 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 9:2800.3, cmt. c. (La. 1983) (“The
duty/risk analysis of proximate cause enunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298 (La.
1962) is not rejected by use of the term ‘proximate cause,’ nor is it intended that
the jurisprudential concept of ‘cause-in-fact’ be changed.”). LPLA supporters
have suggested that the Law Institute’s comments to the 1983 bill are a valuable
source of interpretive authority for understanding the LPLA. See also Kennedy,
supra note 33, at 569. Despite the comment to the contrary, the inclusion of the
term “proximate cause” only adds confusion given the term’s close historical
association with the concept of “foreseeability.” See Galligan, supra note 91, at
1513–14.
146. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1513.
147. Id. (“What is proximate cause? Well it is really a way of deciding whether
society ought to hold this defendant, whose negligent acts were a cause-in-fact of
the plaintiff’s damages, liable under these circumstances . . . .”).
148. Id. at 1513–14 (“Such questions are generally not susceptible to purely
rational responses.”). For example, consider if the tire jack collapses while
Kampen is changing a flat tire. He is not injured, but his elderly mother, standing
nearby, is so startled by the commotion that she faints, falls, and breaks her hip.
Absent any proximate cause limitation, the manufacturer should be liable for the
mother’s broken hip if she establishes reasonably anticipated use, breach, and
cause-in-fact. A jury applying proximate cause concepts, however, may deny
liability because of the unforeseen or bizarre manner of the injury and its
disconnect from the more foreseeable risk that the falling car would crush
Kampen’s foot.
149. Galligan, supra note 91, at 1513.
150. Id. at 1524–27.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 317

4/15/20 8:48 AM

596

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

The text of the LPLA states “proximately caused,” but commentators
argue that duty/risk principles should apply.151 As with duty and breach,
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Broussard holding provides guidance on
the proper allocation of decision-making responsibility between judge and
jury.152 Applying the logic of Broussard, the jury should normally decide
the proximate cause question because it looks like a mixed question given
its fact-specific nature.153 Following Broussard, it would be inconsistent
to have the jury decide the contours of the duty as part of its breach inquiry
while allowing the judge to contract or expand the scope of the duty under
the guise of duty/risk.154 There may be instances where the judge should
do so for policy reasons, similar to the judge’s authority to answer legal
duty questions, but these occurrences should be rare.155
Finally, it is important to keep consideration of proximate cause
separate from reasonably anticipated use because the language of the
statute suggests that each concept is a separate potential limit on a
manufacturer’s liability.156 The statute asks whether the plaintiff’s product
use is “reasonably anticipated” but whether his injuries are “proximately
caused” by the unreasonably dangerous product characteristic.157
Reasonably anticipated use places a limit on duty that the jury should
decide as part of its breach determination.158 Proximate cause places a
potential limit on the extent or type of injuries for which the plaintiff can
recover, as regulated by the jury’s decision of whether the unreasonably
dangerous condition “proximately caused” the injury, subject to the
LPLA’s statutory definition of “damage.”159 Consider, theoretically, that a
jury could have found that Kampen’s use was reasonably anticipated and
151. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A) (2018).
152. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 179
(La. 2013); supra Section III.B.
153. See Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 183–85.
154. Id. at 184–85.
155. See infra Section IV.C.
156. See Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 323 (5th Cir.
1998) (Benavides, J., dissenting) (explaining that foreseeable risk of harm is a
proximate cause concept distinct from reasonably anticipated use).
157. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A) (2018). By contrast, many of the preLPLA cases asked whether the injury was reasonably anticipated. See, e.g., Weber
v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins., 250 So. 2d 754, 755 (La. 1971) (“A manufacturer of
a product which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any person,
whether the purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part, sustains an
injury caused by a defect in the design, composition, or manufacture of the article,
if the injury might reasonably have been anticipated.”).
158. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54(A).
159. Id. § 9:2800.53.
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the jack was unreasonably dangerous, but the jury could still retain the
ability to deny liability on proximate cause grounds. Finally, only after
determining the manufacturer’s potential liability should the jury consider
the comparative fault of other parties, including the plaintiff.
E. Comparative Fault
The Louisiana Legislature adopted a comparative fault system in 1979
that clearly overruled the doctrine of contributory negligence, under which
any plaintiff negligence created a total bar to recovery.160 In 1984, the
Louisiana Supreme Court further clarified that the legislative adoption of
comparative fault abolished the judicial doctrine of “assumption of the
risk.”161 In 1985, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast endorsed a policy of selectively applying comparative fault in
strict liability cases.162 Bell, a pre-LPLA products liability case, allowed a
negligent plaintiff to recover 100% of his damages if the court determined
that the risk of the plaintiff’s negligent conduct fell within the scope of the
manufacturer’s duty.163
The legislature amended the Civil Code in 1996 to apply comparative
fault to “any action for damages” arising under “any law” or “theory of
liability.”164 The broad reference to “any law” clearly includes the LPLA,
passed eight years earlier.165 The amendment effectively overruled Bell, as
160. Act No. 431, 1979 La. Acts 1165 (current version LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323
(2018)).
161. See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988)
(rejecting “assumption of the risk” as inconsistent with comparative fault). Using
the doctrine, courts denied recovery to negligent plaintiffs under the guise that the
plaintiffs’ “assumption of the risk” removed that risk from the scope of the
defendant’s duty. In reality, it was often impossible to meaningfully differentiate
behavior that constituted contributory negligence from behavior that constituted
assumption of the risk. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
162. See Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171–72 (La. 1985) (holding
that comparative fault should apply in a strict liability case only when it will
provide product users with an incentive to improve safety).
163. See id. at 172. In Bell, the plaintiff was injured by an industrial machine
while performing a repetitive motion as required by his employer. The Court held
that comparative fault should not apply because it would not effectively deter such
“ordinary” negligence by workers but would reduce the incentive for
manufacturers to design and produce machines with additional safety feature. Id.
164. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018).
165. Dumas v. Dept. of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 828 So. 2d 530, 537
(La. 2002) (“We find the language of Articles 2323 and 2324(B), as amended by
Act 3, is clear, unambiguous, and does not lead to absurd consequences. . . . ‘The
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well as other judicially created doctrines that courts used to either fully
compensate a negligent plaintiff or to control the apportionment of fault in
multi-defendant situations.166
Courts should follow the clear legislative preference for comparative
fault and not apply the “reasonably anticipated use” requirement in a
manner that risks barring recovery to a plaintiff on account of his
negligence.167 Courts instead should completely separate the question of
manufacturer fault from the issue of plaintiff negligence and comparative
fault.168 Unfortunately, the case law shows the courts have frequently done
the opposite, denying recovery to negligent plaintiffs by defining “use” in
an unusually specific manner that excludes a particular plaintiff’s
negligent conduct.169
IV. APPLYING “REASONABLY ANTICIPATED USE” IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURT
Early judicial applications of “reasonably anticipated use” correctly
focused on product use, but, over time, courts have had increasing
difficulty in separating analyses of product use and plaintiff negligence.170
Two trends are evident throughout the cases: (1) increasingly specific
definitions of “reasonably anticipated use” that conflate the elements of
duty, breach, and proximate cause; and (2) application of the “reasonably
anticipated use” element in a manner that consistently undermines
Louisiana’s pure comparative fault system.171

[foregoing] provisions . . . shall apply to any claim . . . asserted under any law or
legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability.’”).
166. See id. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
167. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
168. See Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 119 F.3d 1193, 1199, rev’d
in part, 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1998) (panel opinion) (“The ‘reasonable’ in the
phrase ‘reasonably anticipated use’ does not refer to the plaintiff’s behavior, but
rather to the manufacturer’s anticipation . . . . Applying the reasonably anticipated
use element to preclude recovery by a negligent plaintiff would ‘inject’ a
contributory negligence bar ‘through the back door’ . . . . If the Louisiana
legislature had intended the reasonably anticipated use requirement to function as
a contributory negligence bar, it could have said so.”). See generally Maraist et
al., supra note 11.
169. See cases cited infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
170. See cases cited infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
171. See cases cited infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
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A. Early No-Duty Cases: Daigle and Lockart
Initial appellate decisions in both state and federal courts involved
uses of the product itself that were either strange or obviously dangerous
given the circumstances.172 In these cases, courts held that the
manufacturer owed the plaintiff no duty because the use was not
reasonably anticipated.173 A truly unanticipated use resulting in no duty
must be contrasted with the plaintiff’s negligent use or misuse that is
nonetheless reasonably anticipated and, therefore, within the scope of the
manufacturer’s duty.174 In a misuse case, comparative fault principles
should apply, but courts often fail to draw a clear line between the two
categories.175 Professor David W. Robertson—an established critic of
judicial use of creative duty determinations that subvert pure comparative
fault—has suggested that a useful analytical tool for deciding whether a
duty exists is to imagine whether a fault-free plaintiff in the same situation
as a negligent plaintiff should recover.176
The first Louisiana appellate court decision to address “reasonably
anticipated use” was Daigle v. Audi of America in 1992.177 In Daigle, the
plaintiff attempted to open the hood on a used car he was interested in
buying.178 Unable to locate the latch in the typical location at the front of
the hood, Daigle kneeled and reached under the bumper without looking,
believing that the cars may have a latch in that location.179 The engine was
172. As noted above, such functional misuse of the product itself should be
contrasted with the negligent conduct of an individual product user whose
functional use is nonetheless anticipated.
173. See supra Part III.
174. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 584; Galligan, supra note 37, at 639. See
generally Robertson, supra note 86, at 1381.
175. See cases cited infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
176. See Robertson, supra note 86, at 1381. (“In a comparative fault case, the
fault of the victim should be relevant solely as an affirmative defense. It should
not negate the existence of any element of the case in chief; victim-fault issues
should not be intermingled with defendant-fault issues. If the defendant would be
liable to a fault-free and otherwise identically situated victim, then he should also
be liable to the faulty plaintiff, whose recovery would be reduced by his
percentage of fault.”).
177. Daigle v. Audi of America, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1992). The First Circuit discussed the scope of “reasonably anticipated use” in an
earlier case, but it did not apply the law because the claim in the case had arisen
prior to the effective date of the LPLA. See Walker v. Babcock Ins., 582 So. 2d
258 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
178. Daigle, 598 So. 2d at 1305.
179. Id.
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running, however, and a moving belt pulley mangled his hand.180 The
plaintiff relied on the pre-LPLA language of Halphen to argue that, under
the “normal use” standard of foreseeability, his injury was reasonably
anticipatable.181 During the subsequent bench trial, the district judge
granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss after Daigle presented his
evidence, finding that the manufacturer should not have reasonably
anticipated the plaintiff’s unusual “use” of the car.182
After noting the LPLA’s “reasonably anticipated use” standard was
the correct standard, Louisiana’s Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
ruling.183 Without elaborating, the court asserted that reasonably
anticipated use was “narrower in scope” than “normal use,” though it is
not at all clear that Daigle’s use would have fallen within “normal use.”184
Nevertheless, the court held that the risk someone would stick his hand
into the engine while it was running did not fall within the manufacturer’s
duty to design and produce a reasonably safe car.185 If one imagines
Robertson’s hypothetical fault-free plaintiff, the result in Daigle is
understandable as a case of “no duty” on the part of the manufacturer.186
Even with a blameless plaintiff, there would still be no recovery because
no evidence suggested that the manufacturer should have reasonably
anticipated that someone would reach up under the car and into the engine

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1305–07. The trial judge’s granting of the motion for involuntary
dismissal resulted in the same outcome as granting a motion for directed verdict
in favor of the manufacturer. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1810 (2018).
In evaluating the motion for directed verdict, the judge should consider
all of the evidence (and not only the evidence offered by the plaintiff),
and should make all credibility determinations and draw all inferences in
a manner most favorable to the plaintiff. If reasonable minds could differ,
the judge must overrule the motion.
FRANK L. MARAIST, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11:8, in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (2nd ed. 2008). The standard for granting a directed verdict is similar
to the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment. See LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. art. 966 (motion for summary judgment).
183. Daigle, 598 So. 2d at 1307.
184. Id. (quoting Walker v. Babcock Indus., 582 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct. App.
1991)).
185. The court approvingly cited the trial court’s written reasons for judgment:
“In this instance, the manufacturer did not . . . or does not have to anticipate . . .
that a person will stick his fingers beyond the flair of the front of the vehicle . . . .
Especially is this true when the engine is running.” Id.
186. See generally Robertson, supra note 86, at 1381.
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while it was running.187 One can easily distinguish use of the car that
should be clearly reasonably anticipated—such as driving, conducting
routine maintenance, and even misuse like speeding or getting into a car
accident—from Daigle’s bizarre use of reaching under the front of the car
while the engine was running.188
The first significant federal appellate case addressing reasonably
anticipated use also involved an unusual use of a product.189 In Lockart v.
Kobe Steel, one worker was injured and another was killed when a pontoon
they had suspended with a chain from the teeth of an excavator bucket
slipped off and crushed them.190 A panel of the federal Fifth Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment that the workers’
use of the excavator was not reasonably anticipated, in part because the
manufacturer expressly warned against this use in the operator’s
manual.191 Admitting, however, that the workers never saw the manual,
the court still found that the use was not reasonably anticipated because
suspending a pontoon from excavator teeth would have been obviously
dangerous to an “ordinary consumer in the same or similar
circumstances.”192 Finally, the plaintiffs presented no compelling evidence
187. It is interesting to consider whether the use would be reasonably
anticipated if the manufacturer knew that others were making the same error as
Daigle. At some point, knowledge of actual misuse by product users must
logically impact what is reasonably anticipated from the manufacturer’s point of
view. See infra Section IV.C.
188. Surely, reasonable people could not disagree that the manufacturer must
anticipate that a user of the car will drive it, conduct maintenance, or even speed
or drive distracted and get into an accident. Recall again that “reasonably
anticipated use” includes misuse that is reasonably anticipated. See Kennedy,
supra note 33, at 584; Galligan, supra note 37, at 639; supra text accompanying
note 64.
189. Lockart v. Kobe Steel, 989 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1993).
190. Id. at 865.
191. Id. at 866–67. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that inclusion
of the warning in the manual was proof the use was reasonably anticipated: “When
a manufacturer expressly warns against using the product in a certain way in clear
and direct language accompanied by an easy to understand pictogram, it is
expected that an ordinary consumer would not use the product in contravention of
the express warning.” Id. at 867. The mere presence of a warning does not end the
inquiry, and the court then added that “this would be a different case if the
plaintiffs had presented evidence that despite the warnings, Kobelco should have
been aware that the operators were using the excavator in contravention of certain
warnings. No evidence suggests such a scenario.” Id. at 868.
192. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7) (2018); Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868. The
court’s language on this point was not the most precise, but it seems the proper
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to show that the use was reasonably anticipated.193 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the trial judge based on this particular constellation of facts,
explicitly noting that granting such a motion in a products liability case
was “not usually appropriate.”194
In both Lockart and Daigle, the courts focused on the use of the
product itself, as opposed to the plaintiffs’ attendant negligent behavior.195
Hypothetically, even if the plaintiffs in Lockart were fault-free, the
manufacturer would still have no duty.196 Lockart would have been
decided differently, however, if the workers had hung the pontoon from a
hook on the excavator bucket that was designed for that purpose, rather
than from the teeth.197 In that circumstance, had the pontoon fallen off the
hook and injured or killed the workers, the issue would not have been
interpretation is that the danger should have been obvious to the “ordinary
consumer in the same or similar circumstances,” meaning an industrial user,
which included the experienced workmen, each of whom had years of experience
working with heavy machinery. The court maintained an objective standard in
evaluating use by considering what the “ordinary consumer” would find
dangerous and did not base its finding on any subjective knowledge of the danger
on the part of the specific plaintiffs. This objective approach is consistent with
Louisiana law. See, e.g., Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
193. Lockart, 989 F.2d at 869.
194. Id. See also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2729.1 (West, 4th ed. 2018) (“The nature
of the claims that underlie products-liability actions commonly present
complicated factual questions that are inappropriate for resolution without a full
trial . . . that commonly cannot be determined on summary judgment.”).
195. For other examples of “no duty” cases where courts focused primarily on
functional product use instead of plaintiff negligence, see Blanchard v. Midland
Risk Ins., 817 So. 2d 458, 461 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2002) (holding a truck
manufacturer not liable for death of unsecured passenger who was riding in the
front of a milk delivery truck that had been designed and manufactured with only
one seat for the driver because “use” of truck by an unsecured passenger riding in
the front compartment was not “reasonably anticipated”); Sturlese v. Six Chuster,
Inc, 822 So. 2d 173, 181–82 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2002) (holding manufacturer
of automobile seatbelt not liable for injuries sustained by the pilot of a “powered
parachute” flight device who claimed the seatbelt failed to work properly during
a crash because the manufacturer did not reasonably anticipate or know that the
seatbelt had been purchased from a third-party distributor for installation in a
“powered parachute,” for which it was not designed).
196. Rather, in this hypothetical, whoever negligently suspended the pontoon
from the bucket might be held at fault.
197. The manufacturer reasonably anticipated such use because the operator
manual included instructions on how to properly suspend objects from the hook.
Lockart, 989 F.2d at 867.
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reasonably anticipated use, but instead breach or causation.198 Under these
hypothetical facts, if a product defect was the proximate cause of the
accident, the fact-finder would still have considered the comparative fault
of the workers and reduced their recovery if they contributed to the
accident by incorrect operation of the excavator or by negligently standing
under the pontoon—neither issue is addressable on a motion for summary
judgment if there were genuine disputes of material fact.199
The Daigle and Lockart courts properly granted the motions following
the courts’ conclusions that no reasonable jury could disagree that the use
was unanticipated.200 Thinking in the terms of Broussard, it is worth
considering that the no duty conclusion should be based on an
understanding that no reasonable jury could find facts to support a
breach.201 Daigle and Lockart might be considered simple because the
facts presented did not require the courts to manipulate the use definition
to justify the motions to dismiss. Courts in subsequent cases with more
complicated fact patterns, however, responded by utilizing more creative
use definitions that skewed the trajectory of the reasonably anticipated use
analysis.202
B. Plaintiff Negligence Muddies the Waters: Myers, Delphen, and Hunter
The analysis employed in Daigle and Lockart correctly keeps the
reasonably anticipated use inquiry focused on the actual use of the product
and not the plaintiff’s attendant negligence, but Myers v. American Seating
Co., a 1994 Louisiana appellate decision, started to blur the line.203 The
plaintiff, Carole Myers, attempted to use a folding chair as a step stool.204
Instead of putting her foot onto the front of the seat, she stepped on the
198. For example, whether the pontoon fell because of an unreasonably
dangerous characteristic of the product (breach) or solely because of operator
error (causation). See supra Part III.
199. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56 (2018); WRIGHT & MILLER ET AL., supra note
194.
200. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2018); FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56.
201. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175 (La.
2013). Lockart is especially analogous to Allen v. Lockwood, which explicitly
clarified that Broussard did not preclude the possibility of a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of no duty if there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the condition was unreasonably dangerous or not. 156 So. 3d 650 (La.
2015).
202. See, e.g., Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equip. Mfg. Co., 70 F.3d 803 (5th Cir.
1995); Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1998).
203. Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
204. Id.
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rear, causing the chair to suddenly “jackknife” closed, seriously injuring
her leg.205 Myers sued the chair manufacturer, claiming the chair was
unreasonably dangerous in design.206 At the conclusion of the jury trial,
the trial court granted a directed verdict for the manufacturer rather than
submitting the case to the jury.207 The trial judge found that Myers’s use
of the chair—specifically, standing on the rear of the seat—was not
reasonably anticipated.208
Much like Daigle, one understandable reaction to the trial court’s
ruling in Myers is approval because it intuitively feels like the right
decision—chairs are obviously made for sitting, not standing. Myers,
however, is surely a sympathetic plaintiff. Everyone understands that it is
dangerous to stand on a chair and it is safer to use a stepladder instead, but
many people take the shortcut and stand on a chair for the sake of
convenience. Perhaps the correct response is to say that sometimes people
make mistakes and should have to live with the consequences.
Given the ubiquity of folding chairs in our society and the tendency of
humans to take shortcuts, however, standing on folding chairs in general
is a reasonably anticipated use, and testimony in Myers showed that the
manufacturer was aware of this use and expected that users would stand
on its chairs.209 The manufacturer’s production engineer testified that he
anticipated people would stand on the front of the chair, but he did not
expect anyone to stand on the back of the chair.210 Offering conflicting
testimony, another employee in the manufacturer’s development
department said the “jackknifing problem” of chairs slamming shut was
recognized across the industry.211 Indeed, that employee testified he had
created and patented an alternative chair design to solve the problem.212
The conflicting testimony from the defendant’s employees caused the
court of appeals to reverse the trial court, finding that “reasonable people
could have reached a different conclusion” as to whether Myers’s use of
the chair was reasonably anticipated and whether the chair was
unreasonably dangerous.213 Then, the court of appeals used de novo
205. Id. at 776–77.
206. Id. at 772.
207. Id. at 773. An opponent may move for a directed verdict at the close of a
party’s case in chief. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1810 (2018); MARAIST, supra
note 182.
208. Myers, 637 So. 2d at 778.
209. Id. at 777.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 778.
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review214 to consider the facts of the case itself and decided that Myers’s
use was not reasonably anticipated.215 The court concluded that the chair
was not unreasonably dangerous because it only jackknifed when a user
stood on the rear of the seat, but was otherwise safe for sitting and
standing.216 The court distinguished the “conceivable” use of standing on
the rear of a folding chair from the reasonably anticipated use of standing
on the front of the chair and further noted that the dangers of standing on
the rear of a folding chair are “obvious” to a reasonable person.217
The odd specificity of the court’s definition of use—not just standing
on the chair, but specifically standing on the rear of the chair—begs the
question of whether Myers’s negligence influenced the court’s analysis of
the manufacturer’s liability.218 The decision is not so clear-cut under the
test of whether a hypothetically fault-free plaintiff should recover.219 One
might consider whether the outcome would be the same if Myers had been
a student at the school and not an employee; it is arguably not obvious to
children that a folding chair has a danger of “jackknifing” if stood on
incorrectly.220
214. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989).
The Louisiana Constitution provides that the appellate jurisdiction of a
court of appeal extends to law and facts. LA. CONST. 1974, Art. V Sec.
10(B). This provision, resulting from Louisiana’s history as a civilian
jurisdiction, has been interpreted as giving appellate courts the power to
decide factual issues de novo. The exercise of this power is limited,
however, by the jurisprudential rule of practice that a trial court’s factual
finding will not be upset unless it is manifestly erroneous or clearly
wrong. Nevertheless, when the court of appeal finds that a reversible
error of law or manifest error of material fact was made in the trial court,
it is required to redetermine the facts de novo from the entire record and
render a judgment on the merits.
Id. at 844 n.2 (citing Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975)).
215. Myers, 637 So. 2d at 778–79.
216. Id. at 779. The court’s key finding that the chair was not unreasonably
dangerous is a factual finding of no breach, yet the subsequent discussion focuses
on whether the plaintiff’s use was reasonably anticipated, showing the close
relationship between the duty and breach elements. Id.
217. The court did not clarify the standard for differentiating “conceivable”
from “reasonably anticipated,” saying only that, “Most people who use a folding
chair as a stepladder utilize the front portion of the seat upon which to stand.” Id.
218. See id. at 778–79.
219. See generally Robertson, supra note 86, at 1381.
220. See Myers, 637 So. 2d at 777. At the root of the question exists a policy
choice regarding who should bear the cost of the hypothetical child’s injury: (1)
the manufacturer that is aware of the danger and could reduce the risk with a
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Delphen v. Department of Transportation & Development, a 1995
Louisiana appellate decision that both state and federal courts have heavily
cited in subsequent cases,221 is another case decided under de novo review.
The decision contains more blatant conflation of elements in the
reasonably anticipated use analysis.222 In Delphen, the plaintiff borrowed
a racing bicycle that had a quick-release mechanism on the front wheel.223
While riding across a drawbridge, Delphen hit a change in elevation in the
roadway, and the front wheel fell off the bike, sending him face first onto
the pavement.224 The plaintiff filed suit against the Department of
Transportation and Development (DOTD) and the bike manufacturer.225
At trial, the jury found the manufacturer 30% at fault for a defective design
of the bike, the DOTD 45% at fault for not maintaining the bridge, and
Delphen 25% at fault for his own negligent operation.226
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that the trial judge gave improper
jury instructions by following a recitation of the LPLA’s statutory
definition of “reasonably anticipated use” with the statement that “normal
use includes reasonable, foreseeable misuse.”227 The appellate court
agreed that the jury instructions possibly resulted in an incorrect
application of the law and reviewed the facts de novo.228 The court then
held that Delphen’s use was not reasonably anticipated because the
“sophisticated bicycle” presented an obvious danger to inexperienced
users like Delphen, who admitted he was unfamiliar with the quick-release
mechanism and had adjusted the front wheel before the accident after it
“wobbled” on a prior ride.229
The outcome in Delphen may be a case in which the result was correct,
but the court’s reasoning includes three errors.230 First, it is unlikely the
known alternative chair design; (2) the school, for not adequately supervising the
child; or (3) the parents of the child (and perhaps their health insurer).
221. See, e.g., Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 311–12
(5th Cir. 1998); Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229, 231 (La. 2011).
222. Delphen v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 657 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
223. Id. at 331.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. The trial judge then reapportioned fault as 50% to DOTD, 40% to the
bike manufacturer, and 10% to Delphen. Id. at 332.
227. Id. at 332–33.
228. Id. (“The jury instructions in the present case did not reflect the correct
applicable law because they allowed the jury to infer that the term ‘reasonably
anticipated use’ constitutes ‘normal use,’ including all ‘foreseeable misuses.’”).
229. Id. at 333–34.
230. Based on the facts, maybe the “right” outcome would have been to find
that Delphen was engaged in the reasonably anticipated use of bike riding, but the
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jury instructions resulted in improper application of the law because there
is no meaningful difference between the definitions of “normal use” and
“reasonably anticipated use.”231 Even though the appellate court clearly
disagreed with the jury verdict and believed the bike manufacturer was not
liable, absent legal error, the court should have left the verdict undisturbed
unless it was “manifestly erroneous.”232
Second, the court’s reasonably anticipated use analysis focused almost
exclusively on the plaintiff’s negligence.233 At a general level, Delphen
clearly utilized the bike for its intended use of bike riding, yet the court
defined his use as not reasonably anticipated because of his lack of
experience and his failure to secure the quick-release mechanism after the
front wheel had already wobbled.234 As a matter of analysis, it is by
refashioning the plaintiff’s negligence as part of his use that the court
found such use was not reasonably anticipated, even though negligent use
can clearly be reasonably anticipated.235 The court’s analysis is
inconsistent with Louisiana’s comparative fault system.236
Third, the court unnecessarily conflated duty, breach, and causation
by citing facts that were more relevant to breach and causation to support

manufacturer was not liable because either the product had no unreasonably
dangerous characteristic, or due to lack of causation. See id. at 334. Such questions
are for the jury.
231. See supra Section II.B.
232. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).
233. Delphen, 657 So. 2d at 333–34.
234. Id. See also Dunne v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 679 So. 2d 1034 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that use of a brand-new exercise bike by the plaintiff, who
weighed between 450 and 500 pounds, was reasonably anticipated use and that
bike was unreasonably dangerous for failure to warn of weight limit; the court
rejected the manufacturer’s argument that plaintiff was not a reasonably
anticipated user because the LPLA standard is “use,” not “user”).
235. Delphen, 657 So. 2d at 333–34. See Kennedy, supra note 33, at 584 (“The
purpose of both [‘normal use’ and ‘reasonably anticipated use’] is to express the
types of product uses and misuses by a consumer that the manufacturer must take
into account when he designs a product, drafts instructions for its use and provides
warnings about the product’s dangers in order that the product not be
unreasonably dangerous.”).
236. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018). Also, because the finding of no
duty is partly based on the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge, it is inconsistent with
Louisiana jurisprudence abolishing the “assumption of the risk” defense as well.
See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988).
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a finding of no reasonably anticipated use.237 Rather than focus on
Delphen’s inexperience, the court could have relied on its finding that the
wheel mechanism itself was not unreasonably dangerous to decide the case
on grounds of no breach. Alternatively, the court could have decided that
Delphen’s failure to secure the wheel properly—along with DOTD’s
negligent maintenance of the bridge—was the cause of the accident, as
opposed to an alleged product defect.238
Before moving past Myers and Delphen, it is important to reiterate that
the court in each case used de novo review power to make conclusions of
fact, not interpretations of the law.239 In Myers, the court stepped into the
role of fact-finder only after holding that the trial court’s directed verdict
was improper because reasonable minds could have differed in answering
the duty and breach question. In other words, the court believed that the
jury should address the question of reasonably anticipated use.240 In
Delphen, the court similarly found legal error at the trial court level.241
Unfortunately, later courts somewhat lost this critical procedural
distinction and inadvertently looked to the specificity of the product use
237. Delphen, 657 So. 2d at 333–34. For example, a factual finding that
Delphen failed to secure the wheel mechanism is highly relevant to supporting
findings of no breach and no causation, but not to reasonably anticipated use. Id.
238. The appellate court upheld the jury’s verdict of liability on the part of
DOTD and reapportioned fault 50 – 50 between Delphen and DOTD. Id. at 33 – 35.
239. See Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771, 778–79 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1994). Judge Dennis noted the problem this creates for federal courts
in Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g, Inc., 258 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2001):
Thus, in diversity cases, a federal court or jury can be bound by a
Louisiana court’s creation of interpretation of state law but not by a state
court’s finding or decision on the facts of a particular case. Indeed, it is
an error of law for a federal district court in a diversity case to base its
ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . on the findings of
Louisiana courts on facts as distinguished from their decisions on law.
Id. at 333. Judge Dennis then went on to assert that:
[Myers] illustrates that the Louisiana courts regard the question of
whether a particular use of a product was reasonably anticipated as a
question of fact for the jury when reasonably people could disagree as to
the answer; and that if the trial judge errs in not sending the issue to the
jury, the court of appeal will decide that question of fact as the trier of
the facts in a trial de novo on the entire record. Thus, the court of appeal
in Myers made a finding of fact, and did not make or interpret state law,
on the issue of reasonably expected use of a product.
Id. at 335.
240. Myers, 637 So. 2d at 778.
241. Delphen, 657 So. 2d at 332–33.
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definition in both cases for guidance when deciding product use as a legal
question.242
The federal Fifth Circuit’s 1995 decision in Hunter v. Knoll
Equipment is an example of the harsh consequences of a court relying on
Myers and Delphen to decide the scope of reasonably anticipated use as a
matter of law.243 In Hunter, workmen on an oil rig were stacking 55- to
60-foot drilling pipes in a “racking board” when the pipes fell and crushed
derrickman Claude Hunter to death.244 Hunter’s survivors filed suit against
his employer and the manufacturer of the rig, alleging that the racking
board was dangerously designed.245 The judge denied multiple motions for
judgment by the rig manufacturer as a matter of law, both during and after
trial.246 The jury returned a verdict of liability and apportioned fault as
such: 35% to Hunter’s employer; 30% to the rig manufacturer; 30% to the
prior owner of the rig, who had made modifications; and 5% to Hunter.247
Significant evidence in the record showed that Hunter and the other
workers on the rig were stacking the pipes with a “negative” instead of a
“positive” lean, which was against industry best practices and known by
workers to be dangerous.248
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Hunter was not killed during a
reasonably anticipated use of the racking board and overturned the jury’s

242. “We have thoroughly reviewed the merits of this matter using a de novo
standard of review . . . . [B]ased upon the evidence of record, we find that the
[plaintiff] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the chair was
unreasonably dangerous in design or because of an inadequate warning.” Myers,
637 So. 2d at 777 (punctuation omitted). Although the court’s key finding was a
factual finding of no breach, the subsequent discussion of whether the use was
reasonably anticipated is what later courts have cited. For example, Myers is cited
approvingly, among other cases, in Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157
F.3d 306, 309–10 (5th Cir. 1998) and Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equip. Mfg. Co., 70
F.3d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1995).
243. Hunter, 70 F.3d 803. For example, when briefly discussing Delphen, the
court read the procedural history as “reversing a jury verdict.” Id. at 807–08.
Although the jury verdict was in a real sense reversed, it would be clearer if the
court said specifically that the Delphen court set aside the verdict and decided the
case de novo.
244. Id. at 804–05.
245. Id. at 804.
246. Id. at 806; see FED. R. CIV. PROC. 50 (2018).
247. Hunter, 70 F.3d at 804–05.
248. Id. at 808–09. In industry terms, a “negative lean” occurs when the pipes
lean toward the mast of the drilling rig, while a “positive lean” occurs when the
pipes lean away from the mast. Id. at 804–05.
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verdict, finding the manufacturer not liable as a matter of law.249 The court
defined “reasonably anticipated use” as the “particular use” of stacking
pipes with a positive lean, instead of stacking pipes in general.250 The court
held that stacking with a negative lean was “conceivable,” but the plaintiff
had not shown that it was reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer
because the evidence did not suggest it was a “common occurrence.”251
Yet the court also said that the evidence showed that the manufacturer
“was aware of the possibility of negative lean and the attendant risk” at the
time the racking board was made.252 The court’s reasoning suggests that
the manufacturer only has a duty to consider risks that arise during
“common” uses, but “common” is not the same standard as “reasonably
anticipated.”253
As applied, the court’s reasoning is uncomfortably close to stating that
the manufacturer’s duty does not extend to negligent uses, which is
incorrect if the manufacturer reasonably anticipated the negligent use.254
One could argue that manufacturers should have a duty to take reasonable
steps to guard against risks of which they are “aware”—even if the risks
are not “common occurrences”—when the probable result of the risk is
death.255 In his dissent, Judge Benavides argued that it was improper for
the court to overrule the jury’s determination.256 He contended that the jury
appropriately considered fault on the part of Hunter and his co-workers as
part of its comparative fault analysis.257 According to Judge Benavides,
“substantial evidence” supported findings that “negative lean itself is
common” and the “overall use of the racking board was routine.”258 Judge
Benavides stated that the majority’s “focus on the ‘tree’ of negative lean
obscures the ‘forest’ of reasonably anticipated use.”259
Hunter is a troubling case. A jury determined that the use was
reasonably anticipated as part of its breach determination, but the appellate
court reversed the jury by declaring the use not reasonably anticipated as

249. Id. at 804. In doing so, the court replaced the jury’s factual finding of
breach with its legal conclusion of no duty.
250. Id. at 806.
251. Id. at 808–09.
252. Id. at 808.
253. Id. at 810 n.11.
254. See supra Section II.A.
255. See Hunter, 70 F.3d at 808–09.
256. Id. at 810–11 (Benavides, J., dissenting).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 811.
259. Id. at 812.
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a matter of law.260 To overturn the jury verdict, the court chose a specific
definition of “reasonably anticipated use” that reflected the plaintiff’s
negligence, rather than defining use generally.261 In doing so, the court
blurred the line between the defendant’s duty and the plaintiff’s negligence
in a manner inconsistent with comparative fault.262
Redefining reasonably anticipated use as a matter of law is judicial
overreach in routine cases like Hunter, in which sufficient evidence
existed for a jury to find liability and where there was room for reasonable
minds to disagree. The ability to define use as a matter of law, however,
may be appropriate in rare categories of cases that implicate difficult
policy questions.
C. Who Decides Policy Questions? The “Huffing” Cases
In a trio of appellate cases from 1998 and 2000, three of Louisiana’s
five appellate circuits held as a matter of law that the intentional inhalation,
or “huffing,” of aerosol sprays or chemicals for the purpose of “getting
high” was not a reasonably anticipated use.263 In Butz v. Lynch—the last
of the three cases—two teenagers huffed from an aerosol can while driving
on Highway 190.264 The driver, Patrick Lynch, lost consciousness, and the
car crossed the center line, colliding head-on with a car driven by Angela
Butz.265 Butz sustained serious injuries and died three years later from
ongoing complications.266

260. Id. at 804 (majority opinion).
261. Id. at 806.
262. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323(A) (2018); see Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521
So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988). See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
263. Peterson v. G.H. Bass & Co., 713 So. 2d 806, 809 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir.
1998); Kelley v. Hanover Ins. Co., 72 So. 2d 1133, 1136–37 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir.
1998); Butz v. Lynch, 762 So. 2d 1214, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2000). “Huffing”
is a generic term for abuse of inhalants, which can include: “huffing” rags soaked
in chemicals and held to the nose and mouth; “sniffing” or “snorting” fumes from
an aerosol can; spraying or pouring chemical fumes into a bag that is placed of
the mouth and nose (“bagging”); and directly “inhaling” fumes. Inhalant Abuse:
Is Your Child at Risk?, MAYO CLINIC (last updated Jan. 13, 2018), https://www
.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/tween-and-teen-health/in-depth/inhalant-abuse/
art-20044510 [https://perma.cc/8Q9N-EHLK].
264. Butz, 762 So. 2d at 1215. The product, Testor Ozone Safe Air Brush
Propellant, was designed for a hand-held air brush used for painting and was sold
at hobby shops and chain home improvement stores. Id. at 1215–16.
265. Id. at 1215.
266. Id.
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Butz’s family sued the estate of Patrick Lynch—who died in the
accident—and the aerosol spray manufacturer based on evidence that the
manufacturer was aware teenagers were huffing the product and knew of
a chemical additive that would have allegedly reduced or prevented abuse
of the product.267 The appellate court, affirming the trial court’s summary
judgment in favor of the manufacturer, held that huffing was not a
reasonably anticipated use as a matter of law.268 In its ruling, the court
stated that the manufacturer’s knowledge of misuse was irrelevant.269
As a logical matter, of course, user behavior—including intentional or
even criminal misuse—impacts what uses a manufacturer “should
reasonably expect from an ordinary person in the same or similar
circumstances.”270 The LPLA standard is not “intended use,” but
“reasonably anticipated use,” and the modifier “reasonably” describes the
scope of what is “anticipated,” not whether the “use” itself is reasonable.271
If enough users are actually huffing, then at some point in time,
manufacturers must “reasonably anticipate” such use as a matter of fact,
even though the activity in itself is not a reasonable, nor intended, use.272

267. Id. at 1216. As part of their theory of unreasonably dangerous design, the
plaintiffs in Butz alleged that the manufacturer knew of an additive (oil of mustard,
found in horseradish) that would have deterred huffing, but waited three years to
add the chemical to its product. The plaintiffs also put on evidence suggesting it
would cost 1.5 cents per can to add the deterrent chemical. Id. at 1216–17.
268. See id. at 1218–19.
The [manufacturer] warned of the grave danger of inhaling the contents.
The user in this case chose to ignore those warnings and instead
intentionally abused the product . . . . It was the users’ intentional abuse
of the product and illegal conduct that caused the accident to ensue. . .
Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that [plaintiff’s] use of [the
product] did not constitute a reasonably anticipated use of that product
by an ordinary person.
Id. The court clearly says its holding is based on a legal conclusion that there is
no duty, though its language that Lynch’s “intentional abuse of the product and
illegal conduct caused the accident” is also evocative of proximate cause—a
demonstration of the conceptual overlap between the two elements. Id.
269. Id. at 1216. “[W]e find [manufacturer’s] knowledge of the potential and
actual intentional abuse of its product does not create a question of fact on the
question of reasonably anticipated use.” Id. at 1218.
270. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.53(7) (2018).
271. Id.
272. Inhalants: Letter from the Director, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/inhalants/letter-director
[https://perma.cc/K985-PM7Z] (last updated July 2012).
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In holding otherwise as a matter of law, the Butz court declared a new
judge-made rule of law that states, “intentional misuse of an aerosol
product to get high is not reasonably anticipated use, period.”273 Under
Butz, manufacturers of aerosol sprays have no duty to design a product
that effectively deters huffing.274 This outcome seems reasonable because
no manufacturer designed its aerosol product with the intention that a user
would abuse it to “get high,” and huffing is clearly dangerous.275 Yet an
estimated 21.7 million Americans aged 12 and older have admitted to
huffing at least once.276 Given the dangers and the diminished maturity of
potential misusers, anti-drug and product safety advocates may argue that
manufacturers should have a duty to take reasonable steps to modify
products to prevent or deter huffing.
More than a routine products liability case, the huffing issue raises
difficult policy questions that implicate broader societal values of
deterrence, personal responsibility, and victim compensation.277 The
common wisdom is that the jury is best situated to bring the community’s
sense of justice to bear on a difficult issue.278 An equally strong argument,
however, could submit that a court is better situated to weigh the policy
consequences of huffing and create a new “rule” for the sake of
consistency and predictability.279 Such exertions of judicial power should
be rare because overly aggressive definitions of reasonably anticipated use
in routine products cases carry a high risk of usurping jury power and
subverting comparative fault, as most starkly seen in two federal Fifth

273. Butz, 762 So. 2d at 1218–19.
274. See id.
275. Intentionally inhaling aerosol chemicals can lead to sudden and fatal heart
failure, seizures, death by asphyxiation or suffocation, and other fatal accidents
due to intoxication. Inhalant abuse has also been associated with long-term
neurological brain damage. Inhalants: What Are the Other Medical Consequences
of Inhalant Abuse?, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (last updated July 2012), https:
//www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/inhalants/what-are-other-medi
cal-consequences-inhalant-abuse [https://perma.cc/D6TF-7KUX].
276. Inhalants: Letter from the Director, supra note 272.
277. See generally Maraist, supra note 117, at 156–60.
278. But see, id. at 164 (“Our respect for the jury system perhaps has led us to
give juries too much to do at a great societal cost.”).
279. Id. at 163 (“The balancing cannot be made de novo in the resolution of
every dispute that sounds in tort; such a result would undercut one or more of the
relevant policies. Without established rules, one could not predict with reasonable
accuracy whether certain conduct will trigger the imposition of liability for any
damage caused.”). See also supra Part III.
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Circuit decisions: Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. and Matthews
v. Remington Arms Co.280
D. An Analytical Mess: Kampen and Matthews
A large number of LPLA cases are decided in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction because many manufacturers sell nationally and are
not incorporated in Louisiana.281 Notably, the federal Fifth Circuit has
been even more aggressive in crafting specific “reasonably anticipated
use” definitions than Louisiana state courts.282
Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., decided in 1998, is the
definitive federal case on “reasonably anticipated use.”283 In choosing its
specific definition of “reasonably anticipated use,” the Kampen majority
cited the fact that the manufacturer put a warning in the owner’s manual
to never put any part of one’s body under the car while it was elevated by
the jack.284 Having thus moved the goalposts on what constituted
“reasonably anticipated use” by reference to the owner’s manual warning,
the court then declared that Kampen failed to put on sufficient evidence to
show that the manufacturer should have reasonably anticipated a user to
disregard the warning and climb under the car while it was jacked up.285
Seven of the sixteen judges in Kampen dissented.286 The dissenters,
led by Judge Benavides,287 argued that Kampen’s use of the jack to raise
the car was not only reasonably anticipated, but was also the “precise use
intended by the manufacturer.”288 In the dissenters’ view, the majority’s
hair-splitting analysis obviously conflated reasonably anticipated use with
280. See Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir.
1998); Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., 641 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2011).
281. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West 2018). An online Westlaw search for
“Louisiana Products Liability Act” returns a list of 1,553 cases, of which 1,236
are federal decisions (as of Oct. 14, 2019). This number includes cases that focus
solely on jurisdictional issues.
282. See, e.g., Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equip. Mfg. Co., 70 F.3d 803 (5th Cir.
1995).
283. Kampen, 157 F.3d 306. The basic facts, procedural history, and holding
of Kampen are summarized in the Introduction, supra.
284. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 313–17.
285. Id. at 317–18.
286. Id. at 318. Of the six judges on the court who hailed from Louisiana, four
dissented (Politz, Weiner, Stewart, and Dennis, JJ.), while one wrote the majority
opinion, joined by a second (Duhe, J., joined by Davis, J.).
287. Judge Benavides also dissented in Lockart on similar grounds. See supra
Section IV.B.
288. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 320.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 336

4/15/20 8:48 AM

2020]

COMMENT

615

Kampen’s negligent conduct in a manner inconsistent with comparative
fault principles.289 The proper approach, according to the dissenters, would
have allowed the jury to decide the case.290 With the benefit of Broussard,
the court could have determined that the question of whether the
manufacturer warning supported a conclusion of no duty was dependent
on factual breach determinations that were clearly for the jury to
consider.291
In the 2011 case of Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., a split panel of
the Fifth Circuit went even further than the Kampen majority and
addressed nearly every element of an LPLA claim through the lens of
“reasonably anticipated use.”292 The plaintiff, Matthews, was permanently
injured while shooting a Remington rifle that misfired, causing an
explosion that sent pieces of the rifle into his eye and head.293 The evidence
suggested that a prior user had inadvertently left out the bolt-assembly pin
when reassembling the rifle.294 Unlike most Remington rifles, the model
at issue had a two-part bolt-assembly connected by a pin instead of a solid
bolt.295 Remington was aware of the risk that the pin would fall out during
reassembly and had given special instructions to its factory employees.
Unfortunately, this warning was not included in the user manual.296 The
parties agreed that when Matthews loaded the rifle and closed the boltassembly, the rifle appeared ready, with no indication that the bolt was not
secured.297
A majority of the panel upheld the trial court’s ruling that it was not a
reasonably anticipated use for Matthews to attempt to fire the rifle while
the bolt-assembly pin was missing.298 The panel cited with approval the
trial judge’s holding that “Remington was entitled to expect that an
ordinary user would reassemble the rifle with all its parts, absent special
289. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (2018). Kampen, 157 F.3d at 324–25. See
generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
290. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 325.
291. The relationship between a manufacturer-provided warning and whether
the use is reasonably anticipated is similar to the relationship in a premises
liability case between whether a defect is open and obvious and, therefore, not
unreasonably dangerous such that no duty is owed. See Broussard v. State ex rel.
Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175 (La. 2013); supra Section III.B.
292. Matthews v. Remington Arms Co., 641 F.3d 635 (5th Cir. 2011).
293. Id. at 639.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 638.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 639, 649.
298. Id. at 647–48.
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circumstances not present in this case.”299 Judge Dennis, however, argued
in his dissent that Matthews had easily met the threshold burden of
showing “reasonably anticipated use.”300 After all, the evidence
established that Matthews was injured while shooting a rifle that, in
outward appearance, functioned properly.301 Judge Dennis maintained that
Matthews should have therefore been able to present the merits of his
claims that his injury occurred because the rifle was unreasonably
dangerous in design and because of Remington’s failure to provide an
adequate warning about the risk of inadvertent, improper assembly.302
Three separate arguments are implicit in the majority’s bizarre
definition of Matthews’s “use” of the rifle. First, the primary argument
asserts that Matthews himself should have taken more care to ensure that
the rifle was properly assembled before firing it.303 This contention,
however, is a comparative negligence argument and is a separate question
from whether his use was reasonably anticipated.304 A second argument is
that Remington did not breach its duty because the rifle’s design and lack
of a warning were not unreasonably dangerous.305 This assertion is a
question of fact for the jury to consider. The third argument is that the
unknown third party who improperly reassembled the rifle prior to
Matthews’s use was the proximate cause of his injuries or was a
superseding cause such that Remington should not be held liable.306 This
question should also be reserved for the jury.307
299. Id. at 648.
300. Id. at 648–49 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 647–48 (majority opinion).
304. Recall that “reasonably anticipated use” can include negligent use. See
supra Section II.A.
305. See Matthews, 641 F.3d at 647–48.
306. Id. In a sense, the court seemed to suggest that Remington should not be
liable because the third party’s improper reassembly of the rifle was the cause of
the accident. The negligent act of a third party, however, does not mean that
Remington had no duty or that it did not breach its duty. The court should have
kept analysis of the third party’s fault in misassembling the rifle separate from
analysis of Remington’s allegedly unreasonably dangerous design. It is the proper
role of the fact-finder to analyze and apportion fault to all parties and non-parties.
Additionally, it is possible the fact-finder would have decided, as part of its
proximate cause determination, that the third party’s negligent reassembly of the
rifle was a superseding cause that relieved Remington of any liability, but that is
conceptually different than saying that Remington had no duty toward Matthews
as a product user.
307. See supra Section III.D.
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Matthews is an extreme example of an LPLA case where a court
aggressively applied the reasonably anticipated use question to answer
factual inquiries of breach, causation, and comparative fault as a matter of
law, thus denying a permanently injured plaintiff the chance to make his
case to a jury.308 The analytical mess of Matthews most dramatically
demonstrates the need for the Louisiana Supreme Court to provide
definitive guidance on how to properly define and apply “reasonably
anticipated use.”
V. TOWARD CLARITY
Not until 2011—23 years after the passage of the LPLA—did the
Louisiana Supreme Court weigh in on the interpretation of “reasonably
anticipated use.”309 The Court’s per curium decision in Payne v. Gardner
is short but nevertheless provides helpful guidance.310 In Payne, a 13-yearold boy climbed on top of an oil well pumping unit to “ride” the pump and
was injured when his pants became tangled in the pump’s moving parts.311
The manufacturer claimed the use of the pump as a recreational ride was
not reasonably anticipated, and it was therefore not liable.312 In response,
the boy’s mother argued that the risk that children would climb on the
pump and sustain injuries was foreseeable and presented evidence of
similar incidents in four states, including a fatal accident in Shreveport,
Louisiana.313
Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
manufacturer, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts.314
The appellate court reversed, finding that a genuine issue existed as to
whether the boy’s use of the pump was reasonably anticipated based on
evidence of similar accidents.315 The Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated
the trial court’s dismissal on grounds of insufficient evidence to support
the finding that the boy’s use was “reasonably anticipated” for two
reasons: (1) the manufacturer testified that the pump was only designed
and intended for pumping oil; and (2) all of the plaintiff’s evidence of
308. See Matthews, 641 F.3d 635.
309. See Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229 (La. 2011).
310. Id. A per curium decision does not identify the individual judge who
wrote it (and is usually relatively short). Per Curium Opinion, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
311. Payne, 56 So. 3d at 230.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Payne v. Gardner, 49 So. 3d 1013, 1019 (La. Ct. App. 3rd Cir. 2010).
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similar incidents occurred after the pump was manufactured.316 The
opinion’s reasoning acknowledged, however, that a plaintiff should be
able to proffer evidence of actual use to show that even intentional misuses
can be reasonably anticipated, potentially creating a question for the
jury.317 In that sense, Payne supports the conclusion that product use
analysis is a factual question for the jury, in line with the Court’s later
reasoning in Broussard.318
Unfortunately, Payne provided little guidance on the proper method
for approaching an LPLA claim that reduces the risk of confusing and
conflating the elements because it narrowly addressed only the issue of
whether summary judgment was appropriate under the circumstances.319
The most straightforward way to prevent the reasonably anticipated use
inquiry from subsuming questions of breach, proximate cause, and
comparative fault is to intentionally analyze each element of a LPLA claim
separately.320 For example, in the recent case of Marable v. Empire Truck
Sales, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit clearly
separated and considered the analysis of reasonably anticipated use,
unreasonably dangerous characteristics, and proximate cause under
different headings in its opinion.321 Deliberate and methodical analysis
would help reduce the risk of courts blurring the elements by encouraging
judges to explicitly explain their reasoning.322 In Marable, which involved
an appeal from a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court also gave due
deference to the jury’s findings regarding reasonably anticipated use.323
316. Payne, 56 So. 3d at 232. The Court further explained that “because, on
the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion . . .
there is no need for a trial on this issue.” Id. In its discussion of reasonably
anticipated use, the Court cited Daigle, Delphen, and Butz. Id. at 231.
317. Id. at 232.
318. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 184–
85 (La. 2013).
319. Payne, 56 So. 3d at 230.
320. See Marable v. Empire Truck Sales of La., LLC, 221 So. 3d 880 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2017).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 895 (“Based on this evidence presented to the jury, we cannot say
that its determination that the accident and Mrs. Marable’s damages arose out of
a ‘reasonably anticipated use’ of the tractor was manifestly erroneous or clearly
wrong.”). Notably, the facts in Marable were complicated: the plaintiff suffered
permanent brain injuries when she was pinned under a tractor–trailer truck while
running alongside it in an attempt to shut off the ignition. Id. at 885–86. The truck
had been idling in a parking lot while the plaintiff and her husband performed a
pre-ride check when the truck mysteriously “popped” into gear and started to
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Drawing on the Louisiana appellate cases concerning reasonably
anticipated use,324 as well as the broader negligence jurisprudence,325 five
rules for analysis of LPLA claims emerge. First, courts in most cases should
treat reasonably anticipated use as a mixed question of fact and law for the
jury to decide as part of its breach determination, unless reasonable minds
could not differ. In any given case, whether a use is reasonably anticipated
will likely depend on factual determinations that are proper for the jury as
fact-finder—for example, the adequacy of warnings or instructions, whether
the use was obviously dangerous to a reasonable person, or whether there
was evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known that the use
was in fact occurring. This approach is grounded in Broussard and is
consistent with the better-reasoned LPLA cases.326
Second, as the Lockart court noted, courts should view motions for
summary judgment in LPLA cases skeptically and should typically only
grant them in cases where the plaintiff is not able to muster evidence that
the use should have been reasonably anticipated at the time of
manufacture.327 In particular, courts should follow the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s lead and focus on what the manufacturer knew or should have
known in regard to use at the time the product was manufactured.328 In
Payne, the Court took care to note that the similar accidents the plaintiff
relied on to establish that her son’s misuse should have been reasonably
anticipated all occurred well after the date the pump was manufactured.329
The Court’s reasoning in Payne suggests that had the plaintiff been able
to cite similar misuse that occurred before the date of manufacture, then a
genuine dispute related to a material fact would have existed.330 The focus
on the “time element” of the plaintiff’s evidence brings the product use
debate full circle because it adequately addresses the “normal use” critics’
move forward. Id. at 886–87. The court could have overturned the jury verdict by
finding that the plaintiff’s “use” in running next to the truck was not “reasonably
anticipated” as a matter of law. Instead, the court did not disturb the jury’s verdict,
based on evidence that the plaintiffs were carrying out the pre-ride check in a
manner that was, or should have been, reasonably anticipated by the
manufacturer. Id. at 894–95.
324. See supra Part IV.
325. See supra Part III.
326. See, e.g., Marable, 221 So. 3d 880; Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229 (La.
2011); Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1994); Daigle v. Audi of America, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
1992).
327. See, e.g., Payne, 56 So. 3d 229.
328. Id. at 232.
329. Id.
330. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 966 (2018).
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chief complaint that courts were using the concept of foreseeability with
hindsight to unfairly impose liability on manufacturers.331
Third, when evaluating reasonably anticipated use, courts should
refrain from relying on overly specific product use definitions that
invariably manipulate the analysis.332 Instead, courts should define product
use on a general level and should defer to the jury to decide specific
product use issues as part of the breach determination. This general
approach will help maintain the proper power balance between judges and
juries and will ensure that courts do not define duty in relation to plaintiff
negligence in a manner that subverts Louisiana’s system of pure
comparative fault.333
Fourth, rarely should courts hold a specific use not reasonably
anticipated as a matter of law. The Supreme Court in Payne approvingly
cited the Butz court’s holding that “knowledge of the potential and actual
intentional abuse” of a product “does not create a question of fact”
regarding reasonably anticipated use.334 The Court in Payne, however, in
the next paragraph, characterized a 13-year-old “riding” an oil pump as
“intentional misuse,” not abuse, and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal
based on insufficient evidence.335 The Court conceivably could have
characterized the use as intentional abuse that was not reasonably
anticipated as a matter of law, but it wisely declined to exercise that power
absent any pressing policy need to do so.336
Finally, appellate courts should emulate the analysis in Marable,
where the court gave deference to the jury’s finding of reasonably
anticipated use and reviewed each element of the LPLA claim separately
and deliberately.337 The judicial approach in cases like Payne and Marable
is consistent with the initial reasonably anticipated use cases of Daigle and
even Myers.338 The Myers court’s reasoning clearly supports an
understanding of reasonably anticipated use as a largely factual question
for the jury, something that was unfortunately lost on later courts.339
331. See supra Section II.B.
332. See, e.g., Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306 (5th Cir.
1998).
333. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 16.
334. Payne v. Gardner, 56 So. 3d 229, 231 (La. 2011).
335. Id. at 232.
336. See generally Maraist, supra note 117, at 156–60.
337. Marable v. Empire Truck Sales of La., LLC, 221 So. 3d 880 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2017).
338. See Daigle v. Audi of America, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1992);
Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
339. See supra Section IV.B.
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To summarize the recommended approach: (1) in a typical LPLA case,
courts should treat the “reasonably anticipated use” element as a mixed
question of fact and law for the jury to decide; (2) courts should review
motions for summary judgment on the use question with a skeptical eye
unless reasonable minds clearly could agree; (3) courts should rely on
general definitions when evaluating “reasonably anticipated use” and
refrain from redefining use in an overly specific manner in order to prevent
analytical confusion; (4) although courts should generally not decide
product use as a matter of law, they may do so in rare cases where
compelling policy rationales are present; and (5) courts should follow the
methodical approach of Marable in explaining LPLA analysis.
CONCLUSION
One is tempted to look at the analytical chaos in LPLA cases like
Delphen, Kampen, and Matthews and conclude that the LPLA itself is
flawed.340 This diagnosis of the problem has an appealing simplicity—if
the statute is the problem, then the “right” statutory change is the best
solution. A review of LPLA cases, however, reveals that the problem is
not with the statutory definition of “reasonably anticipated use,” just as the
jurisprudential definition of “normal use” was not problematic.341 Rather,
the problem is the judicial application of the standard and the
consequences of that application, particularly in terms of the distribution
of power between the judge and the jury and the implications for the
integrity of Louisiana’s comparative fault regime.342 These problems are
not unique to the LPLA but are present throughout Louisiana tort law.343
Thirty years ago, the drafters of the LPLA looked to solve what they
saw as a jurisprudential problem with statutory reform.344 Today, another
statutory revision of products liability law could do more harm than good
and lead to more confusion rather than clarity. The better approach is to
leave the LPLA as it is and focus efforts on clarifying the judicial approach
to LPLA claims. Methodical analysis of LPLA cases, informed by general
tort law principles and jurisprudence, should result in a more equitable
process for both plaintiffs and defendants and should ultimately encourage
judicial application of the LPLA that is truer to the statute.

340. See supra Part IV.
341. See supra Part II.
342. See supra Part IV.
343. See generally Maraist et al., supra note 11; ROBERTSON, supra note 16;
supra Part III.
344. See supra Part II.
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